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ARTICLES
Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma
CHRIS BRUMMER* & YESHA YADAV**
Whether in response to robo advising, artificial intelligence, or crypto-
currencies such as Bitcoin, regulators around the world have made it a
top policy priority to supervise the exponential growth of financial tech-
nology (or 'fintech") in the post-crisis era. However, applying traditional
regulatory strategies to new technological ecosystems has proved concep-
tually difficult. Part of the challenge lies in managing the trade-offs that
accompany the regulation of innovations that could, conceivably, both
help and hurt consumers as well as market participants. Problems also
arise from the common assumption that today's fintech is a mere continua-
tion of the story of innovation that has shaped finance for centuries.
This Article offers a new theoretical framework for understanding and
regulating fintech by showing how the supervision of financial innovation
is invariably bound by what can be described as a policy trilemma.
Specifically, we argue that when seeking to provide clear rules, maintain
market integrity, and encourage financial innovation, regulators have long
been able to achieve, at best, only two out of these three goals. Moreover,
today's innovations exacerbate the trade-offs historically embodied in the
trilemma by breaking down financial services supply chains into discrete
parts and disintermediating traditional functions using cutting edge, but
untested, technologies, thereby introducing unprecedented uncertainty as
to their risks and benefits. This Article seeks to catalogue the strategies
taken by regulatory authorities to navigate the trilemma, and posits them
as operating across a spectrum of interrelated responses. The Article then
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proposes supplemental administrative tools to support not only market,
but also regulatory experimentation and innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
When Bitcoin rocketed in value nearly twentyfold in 2017, regulators around
the world faced a barrage of questions concerning the rising tide of technology
leveraging distributed ledger operating systems for new and emerging ventures.1
Among the most pressing was just what to call Bitcoin and other virtual curren-
cies such as Ether and Ripple's XRP that were hitting the financial mainstream
and promising to transform how payments were made and value exchanged.2
Were these "cryptocurrencies" really "currencies" like the U.S. dollar or British
pound? Or were they securities? Commodities, akin to a digital version of gold,
perhaps?3 Or a construct necessitating an altogether new legal category?
After bouncing around the inboxes of government agencies across the globe,
the query leapt to public prominence on the back of financing techniques called
initial coin offerings (ICOs) that were designed to help entrepreneurs and technol-
ogists raise money for startup projects.4 Unlike traditional initial public offerings
(IPOs), in which issuers sold stocks and bonds following the disclosure of a heavy
load of legally mandated information, ICOs involved offerings of digital "tokens"
or "coins" often denominated in a cryptocurrency. After purchase, these virtual
assets would entitle participants to non-financial rights like access to the technol-
ogy the promoters were promising to create and, in some instances, to acquire a
pre-prescribed economic interest in the entrepreneur's project as well.5 With
these ICOs, novel questions arose as to whether the coins were in fact securities,
and whether the disclosures and sales made to participants had to meet the
1. See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Bitcoin Hits Another Record High in March Towards $20,000,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-markets-bitcoin/bitcoin-hits-
another-record-high-in-march-towards-20000-idUSKBN1E60PE [https://perma.cc/JJ8F-WUA5]; Jay
Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 [https://
perma.cc/QAQ5-PZDA].
2. See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Beyond the Bitcoin Bubble, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/16/magazine/beyond-the-bitcoin-bubble.html [https://nyti.ms/2FGVArL] (observing
also how the "real promise" of blockchain platforms and virtual currencies may lie "not in displacing our
currencies but in replacing much of what we now think of as the internet, while at the same time returning
the online world to a more decentralized and egalitarian system").
3. See, e.g., Nathaniel Taplin, Bitcoin Isn't a Currency, It's a Commodity--Price It that Way, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2018, 11:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-isnt-a-currency-its-a-commodityprice-
it-that-way- 1515041387 [https://perma.cc/4V6W-2QHC].
4. See generally Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (July 25,
2017), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-initial-
coin-offerings [https://perma.cc/B3DB-8DD5]; Nathaniel Popper, Despite S.E.C. Warning, Wave of Initial
Coin Offerings Grows, N.Y. TiMEs (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/business/
dealbook/initial-coin-offerings-sec-virtual-currency.html [https://nyti.ms/2vddEGR]; Nathaniel Popper,
S.E.C. Issues Warning on Initial Coin Offerings, N.Y. TIms (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/25/business/sec-issues-waring-on-initial-coin-offerings.html [https://nyti.ms/2tIJSuF].
5. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 4; see also Chris Brummer et al., What Should be Disclosed in an
ICO?, in CRYPTOASSETS (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
3293311 [https://perma.cc/Q26R-9VR7].
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requirements of U.S. securities laws.6 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) responded by announcing that the question would ulti-
mately depend on the facts and circumstances of the offering, and warned
that many of the digital tokens could comprise investment contracts as
defined under the Howey test, its long-established yardstick for determining
whether a non-conventional financial product is a security.7 Although the
announcement provided some clarity to the question whether ICO offerings
could be regulated, the absence of bright-line rules and the need to apply
the multi-part Howey test to at times complex technical systems, under-
scored ongoing uncertainties about the exact application of securities laws
to these novel financing techniques.8
Yet for all of the attention it generated, the SEC's guidance was not the first
public foray by securities regulators into the oversight of new digital technolo-
gies, or even the first of that regulatory cycle. When markets tumbled in the wake
of the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union in June 2016,
Betterment LLC-an investment advisory firm then managing $4.8 billion-
temporarily halted trading.9 Betterment's decision was one largely in sync with
6. See, e.g., DAVISPOLK, SEC CONFIRMS THAT SOME INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS ARE ILLEGAL
UNREGISTERED SECURIIS OFFERINGS (2017), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-07-27 sec confirms_
that some initial coin offerings are illegal unregistered securities offerings.pdf (noting that although the
"technologies underlying" ICOs "are radically new," regulators will look to regulate them using existing
securities laws).
7. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 4; see also Exchange Act Release No. 81,207, 117 SEC Docket
34-81,207 (July 25, 2017); SEC Debuts Roadmap for Resolving Illegal ICOs, DAVISPOLK (Nov. 20,
2018), https://alerts.davispolk.com/10/4020/uploads/20 18- 11 -20-sec-debuts-roadmap-resolving-
illegal -icos.pdf?sid=dfcdb0dl -5332-4548 -adf3 -91a9flf43b94 [https://perma.cc/8EYV-LCX9]. The U.S.
Supreme Court established the Howey test in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), as the standard
by which to determine whether a claim might be deemed to be an investment contract and thus a security
under Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74,
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012)). According to the Howey test, unless the
context suggests otherwise, a claim is a security if it constitutes (i) an investment of money (ii) as
part of a common enterprise (iii) for profits and (iv) these profits are generated through the
managerial efforts of parties other than the investors. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. These criteria have
long constituted the basis for extensive litigation and caselaw. See also a nuanced and detailed
speech by William Hinman, SEC Director of Corporation Finance, analyzing the application of the
Howey test to digital assets like cryptocurrencies and ICOs and how distributed ledger networks
impact this determination. William Hinman, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto: Digital Asset Transactions: When
Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-
061418 [https://perma.cc/557S-29VZ]; see also Chris Brummer et al., supra note 5.
8. See Karsten Wbckener et al., Regulation of Initial Coin Offerings, WHITE & CASE (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/regulation-initial-coin-offerings [https ://perma.cc/HY62-
HLZJ]; see also Examining the Cryptocurrencies and ICO Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 42-48 (statement of Chris Brummer, Professor Georgetown University Law
Center, noting the importance of clear and tailored disclosure rules for ICOs).
9. See Michael Wursthorn & Anne Tergesen, Robo Adviser Betterment Suspended Trading During
'Brexit' Market Turmoil, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2016, 7:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robo-
adviser-betterment-suspended-trading-during-brexit-market-turmoil- 1466811073 [https://perma.cc/
G6NL-KTSM]; see also Riva Gold, Mike Bird & Akane Otani, Dow Industrials Tumble After 'Brexit'
Vote, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2016, 11:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pound-plunges-on-u-k-
vote-to-leave-eu-1466753711 [https://perma.cc/DDM4-R9NZ] (describing how the "shock from the
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investor protection: choosing to spare its clients the higher transaction costs that
accompanied bouts of volatility like those following Brexit.° What caught regu-
lators' attention, however, was the disputable quality of disclosures Betterment
made to its customers about when and how Betterment might restrict their trading
opportunities.1 But a possible reprimand by securities regulators would first
require a determination as to how Betterment was even regulated. Betterment
was not, after all, the usual "bricks-and-mortar" investment firm, long the subject
of detailed securities rulemaking. 12  Instead, it was a radically new
entity-a "robo advisor" that relied on automated algorithms to manage and allo-
cate client funds into preferred investment opportunities.
13
Other U.S. regulators have faced similar challenges when regulating novel
products and technologies in an increasingly digital marketplace.14 For all of the
SEC's high profile interventions in the ICO market, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), the U.S. regulator of commodities and derivatives
securities, is widely considered to be the likely primary regulator of Bitcoin and
Bitcoin-related derivatives as well as other major crypto-currencies like
U.K.'s surprise vote to leave the European Union swept across global markets, punishing stocks, the
British pound and emerging-market currencies").
10. Betterment's assets under management have been growing rapidly, reaching around $8.5 billion
in April 2017. See Peter Cohan, Growing at 300% to $8.5 Billion, Betterment Offers Fee, Tax Edge,
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2017, 8:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2017/04/26/growing-at-
300-to-8-5-billion-betterment-offers-fee-tax-edge/#10aa592b3ff3 [https://perma.cc/3E87 -D5JV].
11. See Suleman Din, Robo-Adviser's Brexit Trading Freeze Backfires, AM. BANKER (June 29, 2016,
3:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/robo-advisers-brexit-trading-freeze-backftires [https://
perma.cc/H2G9 -5LUT]; Wursthorn & Tergesen, supra note 9.
12. This field of regulation is vast. See, e.g., Investment Advisory Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b- Ito
80b-20 (2012).
13. See Gregg Schoenberg, Betterment Keeps Growing As Fintech Competitors Rise, TECHCRUNCH,
https://techcrunch.com/201 8/09/28/betterment-keeps -growing -as- fintech-competitors -rise/ [https://
perma.cc/EDZ9-F5DW] (last visited Dec. 10, 2018); Wursthorn & Tergesen, supra note 9; see also
Michael Wursthorn, Regulator Tells Betterment to Revise Policies After June Trading Halt, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 15, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulator-tells-betterment-to-revise-policies-
after-june-trading-halt- 1473962235 [https://perma.cc/Q4MV- 8YSX].
On robo advising and the growth of the industry, including discussion of costs and benefits of firms,
see generally Can Robo Advisers Replace Human Financial Advisers?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016,
10:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-robo-advisers-replace-human-financial-advisers-
1456715553 [https://perma.cc/FQ3D-HMHM], and Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo
Advice Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REv. 713 (2018). In addition, Anne
Tergesen and Michael Wursthorn, describe concerns by the Massachusetts Secretary of the
Commonwealth regarding the trading halt and the broader capacity of robo advisors to act as fiduciaries.
Anne Tergesen & Michael Wursthorn, Robo Adviser Betterment Stokes Concern Over Brexit Trading
Halt, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robo-adviser-betterment-
stokes -concern-over-brexit- trading-halt- 1467403366 [https://perma.cc/H5QM-93CV],
14. For an outline of fintech and its key technologies, see CHRIS BRUMMER & DANIEL GORFINE,
MILKEN INST., FINTECH: BUILDING A 21ST-CENTURY REGULATOR'S TOOLKIT (2014). For a discussion of
the Federal Trade Commission's interest in regulating unfair and deceptive practices for nonbank
financial firms, see JUSTINE A. DI GIOVANNI ET AL., DAVISPOLK, THE FTC's GROWING ENFORCEMENT
INTEREST IN FINTECH (2018), https://www.finregreform.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2018/09/
2018-09-11 The FTCsGrowingEnforcementInterest in Fintech.pdf
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Ethereum. i5 Moreover, the CFTC has been tasked with introducing more, not
less, technological innovation since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010, in order to
facilitate greater transparency and integrity in derivatives markets.16 Meanwhile,
banking regulators-including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC), Federal Reserve, and
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB)-have all grappled with how
to oversee and regulate new technologically savvy entrants into the lending and
payments industries. From seemingly out of nowhere, thousands of new upstart
firms operating without a physical presence are clamoring to offer all-digital,
15. In accordance with its mandate, the CFTC can act to prevent fraud and manipulation in
commodities that serve as reference assets for derivatives. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM'N, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 10-13 (2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/
files/idc/groups/public/%40customerprotection/documents/file/labcftc-primercurrencies 100417.pdf. In
2015, the CFTC determined that virtual currencies could be "commodities" under the jurisdiction of the
CFTC, a determination upheld in federal court. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, CFTC Staff Issues Advisory for Virtual Currency Products (May 21, 2018), https://www.cftc.
gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7731-18 [https://perma.cc/5ECT-Q8R5]; see also OFFICE OF THE N.Y.
ATTORNEY GEN., VIRTUAL MARKETS INTEGRITY INITIATIVE (2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
vmiireport.pdf; Jai R. Massari et al., CFTC Acts Against Bitcoin Fraud: Enforcement Against Garden
Variety Fraud with Implications for Virtual Currencies and ICOs, DAVISPOLK (Sept. 22, 2017), https://
www.finregreform.com/single-post/2017/09/22/cftc-acts -against-bitcoin-fraud-enforcement-against-garden-
variety-fraud-with-implications-for-virtual-currencies-and-icos/ [https://perma.cc/6XK2-KQEC]; Brendan
Pierson, Virtual Currencies Are Commodities, U.S. Judge Rules, REUTERS (Mar. 6,2018, 6:11 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cftc-bitcoin/virtual-currencies-are-commodities-u- s-judge-rules-
idUSKCN1GI32C [https://perma.cc/6D3X-N7AB]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, CFTC Charges Nicholas Gelfman and Gelfman Blueprint, Inc. with Fraudulent Solicitation,
Misappropriation, and Issuing False Account Statements in Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme (Sept. 21, 2017),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7614-17 [https://perma.cc/4SJS -A8VW].
By contrast, classifying virtual currencies as "securities" under the Securities Act of 1933 represents a
thornier task. Take, for example, the distributed ledger technology underpinning virtual currencies like
Bitcoin. It disassociates the currency's value from a group of promoters and vests it in a decentralized
operating system without a central locus of responsibility. This, notes SEC Director Hinman, makes it
difficult to bring virtual currencies within the definition of a security under the Howey test. Hinman,
supra note 7; see also supra note 7. However, depending on a fact-based, case-by-case analysis, it may
be that a particular scheme qualifies as a security. See Wdckener et al., supra note 8. On the introduction
of Bitcoin derivatives, see, for example, Factbox: Cboe Launches Bitcoin Futures Contracts, CME to
Follow, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2017, 1:04 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-futures-contracts-
factbox/factbox -cboe -cme -to- launch-bitcoin- futures -contracts -idUKKBN 1E 1OJ8 [https://perma.cc/
GA28-RLNX].
16. Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act-the Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010-
mandated thoroughgoing changes to encourage financial innovation while also regulating it, pushing the
introduction of electronic trading and reporting platforms to help markets make better sense of certain
derivatives transactions and their relevance for financial stability. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 901, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78a (2010)). The Chairman and Chief Economist at the CFTC noted the effectiveness of
reforms to the derivatives markets since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. See J. CHRISTOPHER
GIANCARLO & BRUCE TUCKMAN, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, SWAPS REGULATION
VERSION 2.0: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM AND PROPOSALS FOR
NEXT STEPS, at iv (2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/oce-chairman-swapreg
version2whitepaper_042618.pdf.
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mobile-ready credit and payment products, allowing consumers to access seem-
ingly cost-effective financial products at the touch of a button.17
One of the first questions regulators face when charged with regulating
fintech-the use of digital technologies in finance-is just how different its serv-
ices are from more traditional finance.1 8 To the extent that fintech products and
offerings map neatly onto historical precedent, regulators can confidently draw
on tried-and-tested supervisory strategies and apply them with few if any
17. See infra Sections III.A-III.C. For example, the Federal Reserve has engaged in efforts to
analyze the place of fintech in the context of banking and payments technology. See, e.g., Lael Brainard,
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Where Do Banks Fit in the Fintech Stack?, Speech at
the Northwestern Kellogg Public-Private Interface Conference on "New Developments in Consumer
Finance: Research & Practice" (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
brainard20170428a.htm [https://perma.cc/2BK2-SWND]; John Schindler, FinTech and Financial
Innovation: Drivers and Depth (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Preliminary Draft No. 2017-081, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cnfm?abstract-id=3029731 [https://perma.cc/7XEY-ZW3N].
The FDIC and OCC are examining, inter alia, the growth and impact of nonbank providers of
banking-like technologies. See, e.g., Katanga Johnson, U.S. Regulator to Publish Fintech Charter
Position in Next Few Months, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-occ -otting/u- s-regulator-to-publish- fintech-charter-position-in-next- few-months-idUSKBN1HG2FA
[https://perma.ccI7KLT-VZBX]; Michelle Price, Trump's Pick to Head FDIC Vows to Address Non-Bank
Licenses "Hold-Up," REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/usa-senate-fdic/
update- 1 -trumps -pick-to-head-fdic-vows -to-address-non-bank-licenses-hold-up-idIINL2N 1PI 17B [https://
perma.cc/JPK9-CNU4]; OCC Grants Preliminary Conditional Approval to Varo Bank, NA., SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SCPublication-OCC-Grants-
Preliminary-Conditional-Approval-to-Varo-Bank-NA.pdf.
The CFPB has also been exploring innovations in the context of consumer lending and data analysis.
See, e.g., Genevieve Melford & Dan Quan, Project Catalyst Collaboration to Improve Understanding of
Financial Well-Being, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/project-catalyst-collaboration-improve-understanding-financial-
well-being/ [https://perma.cc/D3BF-DWVV].
18. We work within this broad definition of fintech-that is, the use of digital technologies in
finance-referencing the reliance of fintech on computer technology. To distinguish today's fintech
from past iterations of innovation, we suggest in this Article that today's fintech generally (i) relies on
the use of big data; (ii) involves complex algorithms and artificial intelligence; and (iii) showcases a
tendency to seek out disintermediation in traditional financial services and supply chains by a
nontraditional set of firms. See generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a
Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=3224393 [https://perma.cc/MEF8-2CSQ] (arguing that fintech is recalibrating the balance
of powers between public regulators and private financial firms); Christophe Williams, What is
Fintech?, WHARTON FINTECH (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.whartonfintech.orgiblog-archive/2016/2/16/
what-is-fintech [https://perma.cc/6VKL-VLKJ] (defining fintech as "an economic industry composed of
companies that use technology to make financial systems more efficient" and explaining that fintech
companies "cover a wide range of sub-industries" but share a common attribute in that "they build and
implement technology which is used to make financial markets and systems more efficient").
However, the definition of fintech can vary. See, e.g., Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Eng. &
Chair of the Fin. Stability Bd., The Promise of FinTech-Something New Under the Sun?, Speech at the
G20 Conference on "Digitising Finance, Financial Inclusion and Financial Literacy" (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/the-promise-of-fintech-something-new-under-the-sun
[https://perma.cc/2MA9-GV72] (identifying the unbundling of traditional intermediary functions as
characteristic of fintech). In addition, for a description of automating compliance and the role of
technology in supervision and regulation, see generally Luca Enriques, Financial Supervisors and
RegTech: Four Roles and Four Challenges, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROLT FINANCIER (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cnfm?abstract-id=3087292 [https://perma.cc/YGX3-CCR7].
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adaptations. On the other hand, if fintech really is new, supervisors should, at a
minimum, reevaluate established regulatory approaches to ensure policies remain
effective for the public and markets that depend on them.
Unsurprisingly, for some analysts, fintech represents nothing but a new itera-
tion of the longstanding story of innovation in finance.19 We disagree and argue
that in fact this time is different: fintech represents a phenomenon distinct from
earlier eras of innovation. For one, much of today's innovation in the design and
delivery of financial services utilizes not just more data, but qualitatively different
forms of data-spanning social media, websites, or digital metadata-that have
never before been available. Second, fintech tends to rely more than ever on not
just online services, but also those underpinned by automated and increasingly
self-learning operational systems. Finally, and critically, fintech is catalyzed by
upstarts that identify and target discrete points in the supply chain for financial
services-such as execution of financial transactions, surveillance and monitor-
ing, payment and settlement, or a combination of all or any of these points.
Instead of established financial firms offering a one-stop shop for these services,
fintech firms are dissecting and disintermediating their delivery, leading to the
potential for fragmentation in the supply chain. 0
These features, we argue, complicate what is already the inherently difficult
regulatory enterprise of overseeing financial innovation. To understand how, this
Article argues that the task of regulating financial innovation comprises a policy
trilemma. Specifically, when seeking to (i) provide clear rules, (ii) maintain mar-
ket integrity, and (iii) encourage financial innovation, regulators can achieve, at
best, two out of these three objectives. For example, if regulators prioritize mar-
ket safety and clear rulemaking, they necessarily must do so through broad pro-
hibitions, likely inhibiting financial innovation. Alternatively, if regulators wish
to encourage innovation and issue clear rules, they must do so in ways that ulti-
mately result in simple, low-intensity regulatory frameworks, increasing risks to
market integrity. Finally, if regulators look to promote innovation and market in-
tegrity, they will have to do so through a complex matrix of rules and exemptions,
heightening the difficulties of compliance, international coordination and
enforcement.
19. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, BEYOND FINTECH: A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF DISRUPTIVE
POTENTIAL IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 12-16 (2017) (noting that although fintech firms have "changed the
basis of competition in financial services," they "have not yet materially changed the competitive
landscape"); see also DONG HE ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, FINTECH AND FINANCIAL SERVICES:
INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 5, 9 (2017) (outlining the debate over whether fintech "will be more
evolutionary or revolutionary").
20. See infra Sections II.A-C. On the effects of intermediation in financial markets, see, for example,
Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 592-93 (2015) (discussing how
intermediaries can "entrench high-fee regimes" and "promote the affirmative adoption of high-fee
institutional arrangements over existing or possible alternatives"). On the role of fintech and systemic
risk, see William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1169-72 (2018) (arguing that
small fintech players threaten to trigger systemic crisis).
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The trilemma's theoretical model allows for a more holistic understanding of
how fintech upends and challenges existing regulatory and administrative para-
digms. With a proliferation of actors, including unfamiliar upstarts, and varying
points at which the supply chain of financial services can be disrupted, the fintech
ecosystem looks increasingly complex, muddying the task of rule writing.
21
Furthermore, just as new technologies present the possibility for welfare gains,
such as financial inclusion and competition, the longer-term effects of many inno-
vations still remain unclear. As a result, by dint of poor programming, operational
malfunctions, or hacking, they risk undermining core regulatory mandates such
as financial stability and the protection of those who depend on financial markets
for their economic security.22
Our theoretical framing also allows for a fuller understanding of diverse
administrative reforms seen in the United States and around the world.23 To meet
the supervisory challenges of a digital age and mitigate the trade-offs inherent to
the trilemma, regulators are deploying a range of novel administrative tools.
Though these various regulatory approaches might, at first glance, appear to
diverge from one another, we posit that they can instead be viewed as operating
along a spectrum of administrative ambition that includes informal guidance,
pilots, licenses, and, most recently, "regulatory sandboxes. '24 These mechanisms,
at their best, allow for flexible, speedy and tailored interventions. Still, they can
be abused, or less ominously, insufficiently adapted to meeting the challenges
today's fintech poses. To ensure optimal policy outcomes, supplemental strat-
egies will be needed to navigate the regulatory frontier. Specifically, we argue
that regulators will have to adopt more robust pathways for domestic agency
cooperation, international standard setting and information-sharing, and private
self-regulatory governance if they seek to more fully capture the gains of innova-
tion while preserving the safety and soundness of the financial ecosystem.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the trilemma and illustrates
its application by surveying key historical periods of financial innovation. Part II
analyzes modern fintech and identifies the core features that set it apart from ear-
lier cycles of innovation. Part III examines the spectrum of regulatory responses
that policymakers have put forward to oversee fintech. In this Part, we apply the
lens of the trilemma to show the trade-offs presented by current regulatory
approaches; we examine how these approaches succeed as well as the gaps and
risks they create given the novel features of fintech. Part IV offers proposals for
regulators designed to help supplement their administrative toolbox as a step to-
ward fostering not just financial but also regulatory experimentation. Finally, the
21. See infra Section II.D.
22. See infra Part II.
23. There is an important literature on the powers delegated by Congress to administrative agencies.
See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 265 (2013)
(detailing the congressional delegation of power to waive statutory requirements passed by Congress to
administrative agencies). The literature in this area is vast and a detailed discussion is outside the scope
of this Article.
24. See infra Part III.
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Article concludes with observations about the urgency of harnessing policy inno-
vation to address the complexities of fintech.
I. THE INNOVATION TRILEMMA: THEORY AND EXAMPLES
Whether in the context of Bitcoin or robo advisors, financial regulation is all
too often theorized as an expression of a simple binary product of industry inter-
ests in innovation and dynamism on the one hand, and consumer protection and
market integrity concerns on the other. 2 But in practice, oversight is considerably
more complicated as regulators seek to achieve welfare objectives that also,
among other things, reflect administrative values such as clarity and predictabil-
ity. In this Part, we explain how, when seeking to simultaneously provide clear
rules, maintain market integrity, and encourage financial innovation, regulators
confront a trilemma. In looking to achieve market integrity, innovation and rules
clarity, regulators are, at best, only able to achieve two out of these three objec-
tives. We illustrate the workings of this trilemma by applying the model to past
eras of financial innovation from the 1920s to present day.
A. THE THEORY
Before we begin, first a word on what our theory is not. Financial regulators
have many mandates. They may include price stability, capital formation, and
even antitrust responsibilities. The SEC, for example, is charged with ensuring
healthy capital formation, prioritizing investor protection, and "maintain[ing]
fair, orderly, and efficient markets.' 6 Our theory does not attempt to provide a
universal account of these regulatory mandates. Instead, our concept focuses on
three foundational objectives which we believe tend to be germane to all regula-
tory agencies and underlie rulemaking in the context of fintech: (i) market integ-
rity; (ii) rules simplicity; and (iii) financial innovation.
Market integrity is the most intuitive goal. Financial regulators constitute the
proverbial "cop[s] on the block. ' 27 They are tasked with combatting fraud and
making sure that consumers of financial services are protected from unfair and
illegal acts that could deprive them of money, rights, or both.28 In addition to
25. See, e.g., DAVID LLEWELLYN, THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 5-12
(1999) (discussing theories of regulation and surveying literature on trade-offs).
26. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.
html#laws [https://perma.cc/ZSA7-N2AB] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). It is important to note that
regulators have many objectives, of which we identify and focus on the three that we feel are
particularly relevant to fintech.
27. Bjorn Forfang, Opinion, How Trump's Financial Cop on the Block Should Prioritize the Job,
THE HILL (June 24, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/339291-how-trumps-
financial-cop-on-the-block- should-prioritize-the-job [https://perma.cc/9KRD-ZARX].
28. See, e.g., FuN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (FINRA), https://www.flnra.org/ [https://perma.cc/
53QK-NVJ4] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (providing tools and advice to help investors protect their
investments from fraud); About SIPC: SIPC Mission, SEC. INV'R PROT. CORP. (SIPC), https://www.sipc.
org/about-sipc/sipc-mission [https://perma.cc/K2J9-XFDT] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (describing
SIPC's mission as "restoring customer cash and securities left in the hands of bankrupt or otherwise
financially troubled brokerage firms"); What We Do, supra note 26 (listing investor protection as one of
the SEC's mandates). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:
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ensuring integrity in individual transactions, regulators safeguard financial stabil-
ity. 29 For economies to remain healthy, regulators support the stability of finan-
cial firms, the (rational) valuation of markets, and overall market confidence.30
Moreover, they help prevent weaknesses in financial institutions from affecting
others and supervise the health of large and systemically interconnected firms.31
Market integrity relies on the presence of a number of important regulatory
features. First, it requires comprehensive rules that target and address risks to
individual actors and the overall market. Robust disclosure regimes are applied
where material factors related to investments and financial services are dis-
closed.3 2 Strong antifraud protections discourage bad actors from exploiting
others, just as safety and soundness measures are applied to prevent undercapital-
ized and under-resourced firms from endangering the stability of markets.3 3 All
the while, enforcement provides a credible threat of punishment when rules are
ignored.3 4
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1793 (2006) (noting the significance of federal laws in
securing well-functioning, safer markets); Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in
Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VIL. L. REV. 1139 (2003)
(offering a critical discussion of the SEC's rulemaking following the Enron scandal).
29. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES
& FUNCTIONS 54-71 (10th ed. 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_4.pdf (noting
that the Federal Reserve was "created in 1913 to promote greater financial stability" and describing how
the Federal Reserve "monitors financial system risks and engages at home and abroad to help ensure the
system supports a healthy economy"); CFTC Market Surveillance Program, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM'N, https ://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/CFTCMarket
SurveillanceProgram/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4NDW-S5LK] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (outlining
that the mission of the CFTC market surveillance program "is to identify situations that could pose a
threat of manipulation"); Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, https://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/65YV-ETH5] (last visited Oct. 23,
2018) (noting that "[t]he Council is charged with identifying risks to the financial stability of the United
States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United
States' financial system"); What We Do, supra note 26 (noting that the SEC works to "maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets" and "promote stability in the markets").
30. See, e.g., What We Do, supra note 26.
31. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 29, at 54-71; Financial Stability
Oversight Council, supra note 29. See generally Daniel Schwarcz & David T. Zaring, Regulation by
Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813 (2017) (noting the application
of stability rules to nonbanks as well as banks).
32. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). On continuing disclosure, see
sections 13(a), 13(c), 14, and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 13(a), 13(c), 14, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(c), 78n, 78o(d) (2012); U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 17 (1994)
("The Division believes that transparency plays a fundamental role in the fairness and efficiency of the
secondary markets."); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 783, 789-96 (2009) (studying the significance of disclosure and corporate governance); Merritt B.
Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 331, 341-44 (2003) (analyzing the benefits of disclosure for market efficiency).
33. See generally Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the Econ. Club of
N.Y.: The SEC After the Financial Crisis: Protecting Investors, Preserving Markets (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/the-sec-after-the-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/X7Q5-
4B8E] (discussing the significance of SEC regulation in fostering market stability and integrity).
34. Enforcement strategies can vary between regulators and jurisdictions. They may include a "light
touch" approach designed to create a more collaborative supervisory culture between regulators and
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Market integrity is not the sole objective of financial regulators, however.
Embedded in their formal mandates-capital formation, investor protection,
competition, and market integrity-is also an interest in developing financial
innovation." That is, regulators have an interest in advancing products, business
practices, and technologies that can assist in raising capital, diversifying invest-
ment practices, hedging risks, detecting fraud, and improving the operation of
capital markets. For example, technological innovations designed to transmit in-
formation more quickly and fully between investors and the market, or between
regulators and firms, can facilitate market monitoring. Tools designed to bring
power and precision to data collection and analysis can offer a better understand-
ing of the risks building within the market. Innovations giving consumers easier
and cheaper access to financial products (for example, on their cellphones) can
help promote the goals of financial literacy and inclusion.3 6
From this standpoint, policymakers seek to create a regulatory environment
that cultivates the development of new, interesting, and socially beneficial finan-
cial practices. Along with the exercise of risk-sensitive oversight, regulators are
tasked with apprising themselves of the potential benefits of financial innovation
for market function and consumers.3 7 Arguably, regulators are arguably required
to wield their discretionary administrative and enforcement powers in ways that
encourage the development of new technologies and industries that improve the
firms, by which an enforcement action might first commence with dialogue, cautions, and warnings,
before the imposition of fines or other punishment. Other jurisdictions can impose greater regulatory
intensity, with high fines and punishment for corporate managers. In the United States, for example,
securities regulators can also look to private class actions as an important source of discipline. For
discussion of the vast literature on these varying regulatory approaches see, for example, Stavros
Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1266-98
(2007) (surveying comparative approaches to the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between
agencies and private self-regulation and enforcement intensity between jurisdictions), and Donald C.
Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L.
REv. 1025, 1032-42 (2009) (analyzing divergences between the SEC's regulatory approach and the
U.K.'s "light touch" regulatory model).
35. See, e.g., LabCTFC Overview, U.S. COMMODITY FUTuREs TRADING COMM'N, https://www.cftc.
gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm [https://perma.cc/DGB4-BGHR] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018)
("LabCFTC is the focal point for the CFTC's efforts to promote responsible FinTech innovation and fair
competition for the benefit of the American public."); SEC Fintech Forum, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fintech [https://perma.cc/F9TE-RQCK] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
36. See Christopher Woolard, Exec. Dir. of Strategy & Competition, U.K. Fin. Conduct Auth.,
Speech at Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business: Competition and Innovation in Financial
Services: The Regulator's Perspective (May 11, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/
competition- and-innovation-financial- services -regulator-perspective [https://perma/cc/45JL-MMZU]
(discussing how regulators promote technological innovations).
37. Regulators have grappled with these challenges across industries. See Elizabeth Pollman &
Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 386-90 (2017) (highlighting the
significance of industry-led changes to regulation); see also Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More
Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 248-55, 267-69 (2018) [hereinafter Van Loo,
Making Innovation More Competitive] (examining the importance of innovation and competition in
finance but noting that the current design of federal regulators is not well-suited to fostering financial
competition and innovation); Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1270-80
(2017) [hereinafter Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator] (discussing and critiquing the reliance
placed by regulators on algorithms to nudge consumers toward welfare-enhancing choices).
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quality, competition, and diversity of the market.38 Innovation can also help
achieve other kinds of goals, including market integrity, by better empowering
investors, consumers and regulators with tools to more successfully identify risks
and malfeasance in the marketplace.39
A final, but often overlooked, objective can be termed "rules simplicity." 0 That
is, regulators seek to craft rules that are easy to understand, anticipate, and apply.41
This goal is distinct and not a derivative notion designed to simply operationalize
the objectives of market integrity and innovation. Regulatory goals may be
advanced through clear and simple rules or through a thicket of more complex, per-
haps even obfuscating ones. A focus on rules simplicity as a separate objective
underlines the significance of clarity, linguistic precision, reduced bureaucratic load,
and rationalized rulemaking as essential parts of the regulatory project, enhancing
an understanding of rules and reducing the informational costs attaching to them.42
This value has both normative and legal bases. Normatively, rules simplicity reflects
that regulatory dictates should attain a level of developed expression such that they
provide for certainty, predictability, and stability. Like any set of administrative, ju-
dicial, or international rules, regulations should be able to be operationalized in
ways that provide order for those bound by them.43 Policymakers can thus create
predictability and coherence for financial regulation, clearly articulate the
38. As detailed in Part IV of this Article, regulators might consider a range of ways in which to
exercise their rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement power to encourage innovation. For example,
providing formal guidance or no-action letters can offer firms a compliance roadmap to help them
determine what kinds of activities are allowed. More recently, regulatory "sandboxes" have offered new
firms spaces within which existing rules have been relaxed or selectively disapplied to incentivize
experimentation with new financial products. See infra Part IV.
39. See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 37, at 240-42; see also Van Loo,
Rise of the Digital Regulator, supra note 37, at 1279-84 (discussing how digital intermediaries can
inform consumers about services and the quality of these services).
40. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Requests Public Input
on Simplifying Rules (May 3, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7555-17
[https://perma.cc/FHN8-F2U2] (detailing how the CFTC is seeking to implement a policy to "Keep It
Simple, Stupid," or KISS in its rulemaking).
41. Much has been written on the complexities of legal interpretation and the significance of
underlying rules to legal interpretation that can offer greater clarity and predictability. See William
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1140-47 (2017); see
also ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE AND
EFFICIENT FINANCIAL REGULATION 45-55 (2010), https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/
44362818.pdf (identifying a checklist of principles for supervision and regulation of financial markets
and emphasizing elaboration of regulatory objectives to justify intervention); Rulemaking Process, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (July 12, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/aboutoigaudit347flnhtm.
html [https://perma.cc/V9RD-BLW3] (providing a clear overview of the SEC's rulemaking process and
the steps necessary to pass a regulation).
There are many challenges to achieving rules simplicity and quantification of regulatory objectives in
financial regulation. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 931, 952-954 (2015).
42. See e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 1-10, 173-89 (2013) (noting
efforts to simplify rules at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs through the introduction of plain
English, summaries of rules, "nudges," and reduced red tape as a core agency objective).
43. See Rulemaking Process, supra note 41; see also Baude & Sachs, supra note 41, at 1140-47
(discussing the challenges of legal interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
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consequences of taking certain actions, and explain what the posture of authorities is
toward prohibited conduct. Rules simplicity also helps to ensure fairness insofar as the
rles applying to any market are easily understood by all seeking to participate in it.44
Rules simplicity can help many regulators achieve broad statutory mandates such
as increased competition and capital formation in the marketplace.45 These larger
objectives can benefit from rules simplicity as regulators promulgate laws designed
to realize them. Greater simplicity in such regulation can lower the barriers to entry
into financial marketplaces, thereby promoting competition and reducing the need
for expensive legal and financial advice. It can thus make it easier for smaller firms
to compete with larger ones because larger companies have scale advantages in
absorbing compliance costs. Rules simplicity can, by extension, help promote capi-
tal formation, hedging, and other financial services by lowering costs to consumers
and thereby encouraging a larger and more diverse group to enter the market.46
B. INTRODUCING THE TRILEMMA
The trilemma arises from our hypothesis that between the three objectives or
values highlighted-financial innovation, market integrity, and rules simplicity-
regulators can achieve at most two at any given time.
Financial Innovation
Rules Market
Simplicity Integrity
Figure 1: The Trilemma Model
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 420-433 (1989) (highlighting the costs of uncertainty and
gaps in rulemaking).
44. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION 14-16 (2012), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs2l3.pdf (noting the importance of clarity
in regulatory supervision); INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 4 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf
(same); ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 41, at 17-19.
45. See, e.g., Woolard, supra note 36; What We Do, supra note 26.
46. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 42, at 7-12.
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In short, if regulators prioritize market safety and clear rulemaking, they
do so through broad prohibitions, invariably inhibiting financial innovation.
Alternatively, if regulators wish to encourage innovation and provide rules
clarity, they must do so in ways that ultimately result in simple, low-inten-
sity regulatory frameworks, increasing risks to market integrity and con-
sumers. Finally, if regulators look to enable innovation and promote market
integrity, they must do so through a complex matrix of rules and exemp-
tions, raising compliance costs and disproportionately impacting smaller
firms and upstarts.
C. EXAMPLES OF THE TRILEMMA
To understand the trilemma-and our later discussion of how fintech
exacerbates some of the trade-offs commonly associated with it-some his-
torical context is useful. In this section, we examine three key episodes in
U.S. regulatory history: (i) the New Deal Era as regulators reacted against
the financial abuses of the 1920s, the resulting stock market crash, and the
Great Depression; (ii) the 1990s and early 2000s as the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act dismantled key legislation from the New Deal period; and (iii)
the years following the 2008 financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
These legislative eras represent more than just ordinary cycles in regula-
tion; they also reflect regulatory ambitions to address discrete policy goals
(for example, preventing a financial crisis or encouraging innovation) that
help approximate the extreme poles represented in the trilemma, illustrating
its trade-offs.
1. The Great Depression and the New Deal
Whatever one's view of fintech, virtually all commenters agree that finan-
cial innovation as such is not new.47 The invention of the telegraph in 1832
would launch a more-than-century-long process of mechanical innovation,
enabling people to communicate across borders and oceans.48 It would also
unleash mechanisms by which to track markets and place orders to buy and
sell securities at locales far from the exchanges themselves.4 9 The telephone
would subsequently find its way to Wall Street in 1878, and revolutionize
finance by allowing faster and comparatively more detailed communica-
tions between traders.5 0 Fifty years later-and just roughly one year before
the great stock market crash of 1929-the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) would roll out a central quotation system for reporting bid and ask
47. See Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to
Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1568-87 (2017) (discussing the significance of history in analyzing
innovation).
48. See ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 30-31, 43 (BeardBooks 2000) (1977).
49. See id. at 30-32.
50. See id. at 32-33.
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prices, and a faster ticker service to publicize them.1
These developments in the machinery of finance would not be formally
described as "financial innovation," but they did reflect a broader wave of indus-
trialization transforming the United States (and the world). Mid- and late-
nineteenth-century inventions such as the railroad, automobile, and airplane
began to revolutionize modem life, and companies needed financing to help de-
velop and mass-produce them. 2 And as World War I came to a close, a genera-
tion of Americans, optimistic about the end of hostilities and breathtaking
industrial advances, was eager to participate in the country's booming stock mar-
kets-and financiers and bankers were more than willing to oblige (and lure)
them with new techniques and strategies for facilitating investment.5 3
No technique was more important than the experimentation with, and commo-
ditization of, margin trading: instead of people waiting to save up money to invest
or businesses plowing profits into ventures, investors began to borrow money
from commercial banks to purchase securities.5 4 Meanwhile, to meet the growing
demand for investing, commercial banks veered from their traditional expertise
of home and real estate lending and loosened their underwriting standards on the
assumption that stock markets would never fall. Some even threw themselves
into the surging market by helping companies raise capital in initial public offer-
ings, or even by trading stocks themselves or through affiliates.5 6
For the most part, Wall Street's imaginative approaches were tolerated by gov-
ernment, even encouraged. A decidedly dim view of regulation, and of financial
51. See Lance E. Davis et al., The Highest Price Ever: The Great NYSE Seat Sale of 1928-1929 and
Capacity Constraints, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 705, 710 (2007).
52. See DAVID CHAMBERS ET AL., GEOGRAPHY AND CAPITAL: EXPLAINING FOREIGN LISTINGS OF U.S.
RAILROAD SECURITIES DURING THE FIRST ERA OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 4-7 (Draft, Sept. 11,
2012), http://eh.net/eha/wp-content/uploads/2013/1 1/Chambersetal.pdf (discussing the methods through
which American railroads were financed in the nineteenth century).
53. See Eugene N. White, The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited, 4 J. ECON. PERSP.
67, 69-71 (1990).
54. See Barry Eichengreen & Kris Mitchener, The Great Depression as a Credit Boom Gone Wrong
3, 9-11 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 137, 2003), https://www.bis.org/publ/workl37.
pdf. As detailed by Professors Eichengreen & Mitchener, the 1920s boasted a slew of financial and
communications innovations following the conclusion of World War I. These included developments in
radio technologies, as well as the growth of financial innovations such as the investment trust and
collateralized consumer lending. See id. at 10. As Eichengreen and Mitchener observe, the advent of the
investment trust in the 1920s, in particular, facilitated the growth of margin lending, contributing to the
excesses of the age. See id. According to this influential line of thought "attribut[ing] the Great
Depression to a bubble in the stock market," Eichengreen and Mitchener state, the ready availability of
credit led to speculative excesses, as well as abusive and fraudulent practices, eventually prompting the
Federal Reserve to tighten credit conditions. Id. at 9-11. These actions contributed to defaults, a sharp
decline in asset prices, and eventually a banking crisis. See id.
55. See id. at 3, 9-11.
56. Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Role of Firewalls in Universal Banks: Evidence
from Commercial Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act 4 (Ctr. for the Study of the
Econ. & the State, Univ. of Chi., Working Paper No. 103, 1994). Although commercial banks had
always to some extent competed with investment banks, their involvement in securities markets
increased considerably. See id.; see also Eichengreen & Mitchener, supra note 54, at 9-11.
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supervision more generally, had dominated American politics in the 1920s. 7 For
the intellectual heavyweights of the day, including President Calvin Coolidge,
governmental intervention more often than not harmed competition and the
growth of financial markets, and thus should be restrained. As Coolidge would
argue before the New York Chamber of Commerce:
[T]he largest possible independence between government and business [is
most desirable]. Each ought to be sovereign in its own sphere. ... When gov-
ernment enters the field of business with its great resources, it has a tendency
to extravagance and inefficiency, [and], having the power to crush all competi-
tors, likewise closes the door of opportunity and results in monopoly. It is
always a problem in a republic to maintain on the one side that efficiency
which comes only from trained and skillful management without running into
fossilization and autocracy, and to maintain on the other that equality of oppor-
tunity which is the result of political and economic liberty without running
into dissolution and anarchy.58
Though embracing a laissez-faire attitude to the changes in financial markets,
Coolidge acknowledged a series of trade-offs associated, at least in part, with the
trilemma. On the one hand, regulation could, he estimated, avoid "anarchy." ' 9
Coolidge does not define what "anarchy" means, though given the context of his
speech and the Wall Street audience, one can safely surmise it might have been
understood as financial instability. But it also created less "opportunity."
Government intervention, it was assumed, helped to entrench incumbents (or the
government itself) and businesses favored by politicians. Rules could additionally
become "fossiliz[ed]" in ways that did not allow for growth and, at least implic-
itly, innovation.6" "Regulation," the President proclaimed, "ha[d] often become
restriction, and inspection ha[d] too frequently been little less than obstruction."61
Along this spectrum of choices, Coolidge decided to cast his lot with the market;
states, not the federal government, would have to take the lead on overseeing
finance.
A reversal of priorities and normative emphasis would arise four years after
Coolidge's departure from power and Herbert Hoover's unsuccessful term as
President.6 2 Presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt would base his
57. See, e.g., McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2012) (emphasizing, inter alia, state regulation and
monitoring of the banking sector); Financial Deregulation in the US, WHARTON UNIV. OF PA. (Nov. 19,
2018), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/ive/news/27I0-financial -deregulation- in-the -us/
for- students/blog/news.php [https://perma.cc/BJC8-BK6S].
58. President Calvin Coolidge, Address Before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York
Regarding Government and Business (Nov. 19, 1925), https://coolidgefoundation.org/resources/
speeches -as -president- 1923 -1929 -5 [https://perma.cc/A86T-E5P3].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Herbert Hoover introduced large-scale spending and public works projects to help employ
Americans, and his agenda did not include the regulation of finance. Hoover was, however, no friend of
regulation. For example, "[e]ven before his inauguration, he urged the Federal Reserve to halt 'crazy
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campaign on an explicitly anti-Wall Street platform, and though not speaking of
financial innovation per se, he spoke forcefully about "man's inventive genius"
and its financial permutations. As Roosevelt would proclaim at his 1936 accep-
tance speech at the Democratic National Convention:
[M]an's inventive genius released new forces in our land which reordered the
lives of our people. The age of machinery, of railroads; of steam and electric-
ity; the telegraph and the radio; mass production, mass distribution-all of
these combined to bring forward a new civilization and with it a new problem
for those who sought to remain free.
For out of this modem civilization economic royalists carved new dynasties.
New kingdoms were built upon concentration of control over material things.
Through new uses of corporations, banks and securities, new machinery of
industry and agriculture, of labor and capital-all undreamed of by the fathers-
the whole structure of modem life was impressed into this royal service.63
For Roosevelt, "new uses of corporations, banks and securities" -key compo-
nents of what we would today call financial innovation-would serve to entrench
a new industrial capital class that was itself built on technological innovation.64
This phenomenon, he argued, would have, a negative impact on capitalism and
the competition on which it was grounded; "[p]rivate enterprise," he bemoaned,
would become "too private," a form of "privileged enterprise, not free enter-
prise."65 In this way, successful innovators would come to dominate markets and
exercise control over the prospects of future entrants and competitors. After a
point, industrial incumbents would, in short, inhibit future innovation and
newcomers.
6 6
Even more relevant to the trilemma, Roosevelt viewed the unorthodox prac-
tices of Wall Street banks and financiers as having contributed directly to the
Great Depression:
and dangerous' gambling on Wall Street by increasing the discount rate the Federal Reserve charged
banks for speculative loans." Richard Norton Smith & Timothy Walch, The Ordeal of Herbert Hoover,
36 PROLOGUE MAG. 30, 33 (2004), https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2004/summer/
hoover-1.html [https://perma.cc/KL5H-R3U4]. He also "asked magazines and newspapers to run stories
warning of the dangers of rampant speculation." Id. "Presidents in 1929," however, "were not supposed
to regulate Wall Street, or even talk about the gyrating market for fear of inadvertently setting off a
panic, and Hoover backed off." Id. In addition, Hoover "also had a personal reason for keeping quiet":
"His conscience was pained after a friend took his advice to buy a stock that later nose-dived." Id.
"'To clear myself,' the President told friends, 'I just bought it back and I have never advised anybody
since."' Id.
63. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the Presidency
(June 27, 1936), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/acceptance-speech-for-the-renomination-
for-the-presidency-philadelphia-pa [https://perma.cc/PYB6-NSLH] (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Enormous corporate surpluses piled up [in the post-WWI period]-the most
stupendous in history. Where, under the spell of delirious speculation, did
those surpluses go? . . . Why, they went chiefly in two directions: first, into
new and unnecessary plants which now stand stark and idle; and second, into
the call-money market of Wall Street, either directly by the corporations, or
indirectly through the banks....
Then came the crash. You know the story. Surpluses invested in unnecessary
plants became idle. Men lost their jobs; purchasing power dried up; banks
became frightened and started calling loans. Those who had money were afraid
to part with it. Credit contracted. Industry stopped. Commerce declined, and
unemployment mounted.67
To prevent future threats to market integrity-and to protect jobs and
employment-Roosevelt concluded that legislation with teeth was needed.68
Roosevelt and his lieutenants would direct their legislative energies toward
curbing rampant speculation and restraining the perceived culprits of the finan-
cial crisis: banks, stock exchanges, and their salesmen-the broker dealers.
69
Banks, which had lent money to naive investors and speculated in securities
markets themselves, would have their scope of permitted action curtailed.70
Stock markets and commodity markets would be regulated to prevent the dan-
gers posed by excessive speculation.7 1
67. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Democratic National Convention (July 2, 1932), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-
accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-democratic -national-convention-chicago- 1 [https://perma.cc/
U9AZ-F5GR].
68. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures Industry-
History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 69 (1991).
69. Recall that, in the lead up to the 1929 Crash and Great Depression, financial markets were
characterized by rampant speculation and excessive credit to unsophisticated investors (through margin
lending), as well as risky lending by banks, investment banks, and affiliates. See Eichengreen &
Mitchener, supra note 54, at 9-11.
70. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Prelude to Glass-Steagall: Abusive Securities Practices by National
City Bank and Chase National Bank During the "Roaring Twenties," 90 TUL. L. REV. 1285, 1294-1301
(2016).
71. As detailed below, the New Deal Era ushered in tight controls on bank activity through the
Glass-Steagall Act, forbidding banks from also engaging in riskier activities like merchant banking. See
Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank
Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FrN. L. 113, 121-23 (2011). It
also saw the creation of comprehensive securities regulation pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and under the oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990) (discussing the history and purposes of the anti-fraud rules
in securities regulation). As a result of these and related reforms, banks were largely prohibited from
using their access to customer deposits and credit to engage in risky securities market intermediation
(for example, acting as underwriters and broker dealers). See Omarova & Tahyar, supra, at 121-23. In
turn, securities markets themselves became more reliably informative on account of mandatory
disclosure and anti-fraud protection. See Fox et al., supra note 32, at 335-36; Thel, supra (discussing the
enactment and enforcement of Securities Exchange Act section 10(b)).
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The overall response embraced in what would come to be known as the New
Deal can be primarily summarized along functional lines. Companies wishing to
sell securities to the public would be subject to comprehensive disclosure require-
ments backed by strict antifraud provisions, with elaborate constraints imposed
on marketing the offering. 72 Disclosures would then have to be updated on a quar-
terly and yearly basis and subject to scrutiny by auditors and other securities pro-
fessionals. 73 Meanwhile, the Glass-Steagall Act, adopted in 1933, prohibited
securities underwriting from being performed by firms engaged primarily in the
business of banking.74 This separation would help prevent any possible abuses by
banks (and their affiliates) in trading with cheap debt and taking risks using their
own money. In turn, banking would be safer.75 As we discuss below, however,
ushering in this era of high regulation created costs on the capacity of firms to
easily innovate within the financial markets.
2. Fintech 1.0 and Liberalization in the 1980s-2000s
The broad regulatory perimeter established under the New Deal and its imple-
menting legislation would remain for the most part undisturbed for nearly four
decades. This outcome was due in large measure to the relative stability of the
market ecosystem of the times. Even as the economy grew in size, depth, and im-
portance, innovative advances in finance faced high hurdles. 76 Financial markets
experienced few radical changes and the actors animating them could be regu-
lated with greater consistency.77
By the 1980s, the popular adoption of computers would begin to transform
finance from the ground up. As computers became cheaper, more widespread,
and user-friendly, bankers, analysts, and consumers would no longer have to
manually process information, make calculations by hand, or rely on crude
72. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 73-100 (3d ed. 2003).
73. On continuing disclosure, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(a), 13(c), 14, 15(d), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(a), 78m(c), 78n, 78o(d) (2012).
74. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162; Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 71, at
121-23.
75. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J.
Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 449-55 (2017) (noting the importance of Glass-Steagall in ensuring
safety and soundness).
76. Following the Second World War, the U.S. economy (as measured by Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)) grew steadily, as did the size of the banking sector. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., ALL-BANK STATISTICS UNITED STATES 1896-1955 app. A (1959), https://fraser.
stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/allbkstat/1896-1955/allbankstats complete.pdf; GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT (GDP), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS: ECON. RESEARCH, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
GDP [https://perma.cc/8F76-4QT2] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
77. Interestingly, even when technology was introduced, its rather limited status impaired trust by
regulators. In the 1960s, the volume of transactions for broker-dealers ballooned and back offices were
overwhelmed. See SELIGMAN, supra note 72, at 457. But efforts to meet the challenge through
automation failed, and even doomed leading Wall Street brokerages unprepared and inexperienced in
technology. See id.
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calculators.78 Instead, machines could be used to break down, aggregate, and
store credit, account, and market data, and information could be inexpensively
shared and transmitted electronically, allowing for faster interfaces in communi-
cations.7 9 The implications for finance were enormous, sparking innovations in
the delivery of financial services from ATM machines to credit cards whose mag-
netic strips could be read by banks the world over.80
As these new tools matured, innovative products and techniques could be cre-
ated and brought to the financial marketplace. Perhaps none would be as impact-
ful as the entry of "securitization" into mainstream finance.81 By pooling
financial assets such as auto, mortgage and credit card debt and selling bond
securities representing claims on the cash flows generated by this auto, mortgage
or credit card debt, financial institutions could potentially reduce the risks associ-
ated with lending and generate higher profits for themselves.8 2 Using data proc-
essing and modeling technologies, firms could use software to extrapolate or
simulate pooled cash flows and create varying tranches of risk and allocate differ-
ent levels of priority to lenders (that is, to bond holders), with those bondholders
wishing to hold the least risk being paid out first.83
Similar processing technology giving rise to securitization would also enable
the development of complex credit derivatives. No such development would
come to engender as much criticism as credit default swaps (CDS). Invented in
the mid-1990s, CDSs would at first offer insurance to creditors if a borrower
78. See Iftekhar Hasan et al., Technology, Automation, and Productivity of Stock Exchanges:
International Evidence, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1743 (2003) (empirically surveying the impact of
technology-based innovations on stock market performance); Craig Pirrong, Upstairs, Downstairs:
Electronic vs. Open Outcry Exchanges (Eur. Fin. Ass'n 2003 Ann. Conf., Paper No. 203, 2003) (noting
the history of computer technology in securities markets).
79. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United States Securities Regulation in an Age of
Technological Uncertainty 15-16 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 210,
2000), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=253763 [https://perma.cc/M3B9-52YD].
80. See, e.g., David B. Humphrey et al., Cash, Paper, and Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 914, 914-15 (1996) (discussing how the "social cost of a
country's payment system ... can be reduced by promoting the shift to electronics"); Stan Sienkiewicz,
The Evolution of EFT Networks from ATMs to New On-Line Debit Payment Products (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper, 2002) (providing an overview of the evolution of debit cards).
81. Technology may be seen as an operational enabler of securitization that began in the 1960s as a
technique pioneered by the government sponsored agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to increase
the supply of housing finance. See Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Anatomy of the Mortgage
Securitization Crisis (Inst. for Research on Labor & Emp't, Working Paper No. 200-10, 2010).
Commentators have also pointed to numerous factors that contributed to the growth of the appeal of
securitization, such as the collapse of the savings and loans institutions and the abolition of Regulation
Q. See id.
82. See id.
83. See generally ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TiL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (2008), https://www.
newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff-reports/sr318.pdf (overviewing the subprime
mortgage securitization process). See also Nicola Cetorelli et al., The Evolution of Banks and Financial
Intermediation: Framing the Analysis, 18 ECON. POL'Y REV. 1, 3-4 (2012) (discussing securitization-
based intermediation).
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defaulted on loans.84 Over time, however, they would also become more specula-
tive. Instead of using CDSs to insure risks on their books, banks and securities
firms began to enter into transactions-often concerning securities in which they
had no direct interest-as a means of placing bets on whether defaults, bankrupt-
cies, or other credit events would arise.8 5 Here, too, technology would play an im-
portant role: to help facilitate the trading of CDSs, electronic trading systems for
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were developed to "link buyers and sellers
that previously interacted through telephones and faxes."86
Policymakers would support the development of both securitization and OTC
derivatives through deregulatory policies. In banking, the path would be a circui-
tous one. Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to help commercial
banks compete with the rise of securitization by less-regulated firms.8 7 Under this
legislation, prohibitions against national banks affiliating with firms in the invest-
ment banking business would be dismantled.88 Banks would be offered more lee-
way to compete alongside investment banks in capital markets, and even merge
with securities firms to create large financial conglomerates.89
Congress would also act a year later to broadly deregulate the derivatives mar-
kets.90 As discussed below, pursuant to the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act (CFMA), OTC derivatives (swaps) agreed to between "sophisticated" parties
84. See Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading in Derivatives Markets, 103 GEO. L.J. 381, 387-95 (2015)
(describing the CDS market and the implications of CDS trading); Harry Wilson, A Short History of
Credit Default Swaps, TELEGRAPH (Sep. 6, 2011, 7:44 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
newsbysector/banksandfinance/87455 11/A- short-history-of-credit- default- swaps.html [https://perma.
cc/WTX6-FFHQ]. In these transactions, a protection seller would analyze the risk that a borrower posed
to a creditor and offer, for a fee, to take over payments to the creditor should an enumerated act of
default arise. See Wilson, supra.
85. See generally Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2007) (noting that CDSs "have grown from a small private market in the
early 1990s to a liquid, standardized market today"); Douglas J. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt
Obligations and Credit Risk Transfer (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 07-06, 2007)
(describing the core economic function and transactional basics of CDS).
86. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE
REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS 3 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/229069.pdf.
87. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). In part, because of
securitization, the traditional lines of demarcation between banks and securities firms eroded as more
nonbanks utilized data collection, management, and processing technologies to compete with banks as
providers of credit. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking,
Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2013) (discussing the role of banks in the
commodity trading and warehousing business); Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to
Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1683
(2011) [hereinafter Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley] (analyzing the gradual broadening of
permitted bank-related activities despite the Glass-Steagall Act); Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet
Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of Banking," 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041
(2009) (highlighting the role of banks in the derivatives industry) [hereinafter Omarova, The Quiet
Metamorphosis].
88. See David Leonhardt, Washington's Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.
nytimes.com/2008/09/28/magazine/28wwln-reconsider.html [https://nyti.ms/2jKkcqB].
89. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley, supra note 87, at 1706.
90. See Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation, and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives, 13
U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1, 33 (2010).
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would not attract regulation as either "futures" or "securities" under the purview
of either the CFTC or SEC. 91 One of the more esoteric but important develop-
ments concerned the question whether new electronic platforms (called "multilat-
eral transaction execution facilities") involved in trading swaps should be
shielded from oversight.92
Usually, trading infrastructure for derivatives such as platforms would have to
be registered with the CFTC. But a Presidential Working Group, comprised of
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Secretary of the Treasury, and Chairs of the
SEC and CFTC, suggested a different approach. 93 In a high profile report to the
President, these regulators acknowledged the risks of under-regulation, but ulti-
mately decided that subjecting OTC derivatives such as CDSs to a stricter regula-
tory standard was too onerous.94 Not only did the "sophisticated counterparties
that use OTC derivatives simply.., not require the same protections under [fed-
eral rules] as those required by retail investors[J" but "most of the dealers in the
swaps market" were, the logic held, already regulated by the SEC as securities
firms or by the Federal Reserve (and others) as banks.95
Critically, in making their determination, the Working Group placed a heavy
emphasis on innovation, and the need to preserve it:
9 6
[E]lectronic trading systems for OTC derivatives have only just begun to
emerge on a widespread basis, and such systems should be allowed to grow,
unburdened by a new anticipatory statutory structure that could prove entirely
inappropriate to their eventual evolution.97
The GAO would later add:
Continued progress in addressing the regulatory concerns raised by electronic
systems could be critical to the ability of the U.S. exchange-traded futures and
91. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763. It is
worth noting that the Act did not entirely dispense with all regulation vis-a-vis OTC derivatives. For
example, certain securities linked to swaps could still attract some anti-fraud liability and banks
involved in dealing with OTC derivatives would be subject to wider prudential, safety-and-soundness
oversight. See Gabriel D. Rosenberg & Jai R. Massari, Regulation Through Substitution As a Policy
Tool: Swap Futurization Under Dodd-Frank, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 667, 680.
92. See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,962 (Dec. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 1, 5, 15, 36, 37, 38, 100, 170, 180).
93. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS
AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 11, 15-17 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-
mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf.
94. See id. at 15-18.
95. Id. at 16.
96. When describing the goals of reform, the promotion of financial innovation was articulated first,
ahead of all other objectives. See id. at 1 ("This Working Group report focuses on changes to the
Commodity Exchange Act (the 'CEA') that are necessary to promote innovation, competition,
efficiency, and transparency in OTC derivatives markets, to reduce systemic risk, and to allow the
United States to maintain leadership in these rapidly developing markets.").
97. Id. at 18.
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OTC derivatives markets to remain innovative and globally competitive. Such
progress requires that the federal financial market regulators remain aware of
how rapidly changing technology is affecting the derivatives markets. In par-
ticular, regulators need to know whether existing regulations are impeding the
development of electronic trading systems in the United States, and whether
additional regulations or different regulatory approaches are needed to protect
the U.S. markets and their users.98
Thus, with the explicit objective of introducing changes designed to "promote
innovation, competition, efficiency, liquidity, and transparency in OTC deriva-
tives markets by providing legal certainty for OTC derivatives and removing
impediments to innovation," the Clinton administration would introduce legisla-
tion that removed most derivatives entirely from the reach of the CFTC's over-
sight.99 Under the bipartisan CFMA, most OTC derivatives would escape
regulation under applicable securities laws."'0 Additionally, trading on the elec-
tronic platforms would, for the most part, escape regulation as full-blown
exchanges, avoiding commensurate regulatory burdens for those who used
them."'1 In this way, regulators concluded, "legal certainty" could be introduced
in a manner that "take[s] into account the rapid pace of change in the financial
markets and in technology.
' 10 2
3. The 2008 Financial Crisis and Beyond
Ultimately, history would prove the deregulatory zeal embodied in these par-
ticular reforms to be disastrous for the global economy. Large financial conglom-
erates became increasingly active in the unregulated swaps market, where credit
protection had been sold for complex, mortgage-related financial products. When
the real estate market collapsed in 2007 and 2008, obligations on the CDS spiked,
and once-vaunted Wall Street names from Lehman Brothers to American
International Group (AIG) found themselves exposed to firm-ending losses.10 3
Because of the complexity of securitizations and swap contracts and the failure of
98. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: IssuEs RELATED TO THE
REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS 4 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/229069.pdf.
99. Letter from the President's Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts. to Al Gore, President of the U.S. Senate
(Nov. 9, 1999), in PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 93; Letter from the
President's Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts. to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Nov. 9, 1999), in PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 93.
100. See supra notes 90-92.
101. Notably, exchange traded derivatives were provided with relief as well. The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of2000: J. Hearing on S. 2697 Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry
and the H. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 10 (2000), https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg70514/pdf/CHRG-106shrg70514.pdf (noting that the President's Working
Group supported CFTC efforts to provide appropriate regulatory relief for the exchange-traded futures
market because some exchange traded futures would have characteristics similar to the excluded OTC
derivatives).
102. Id. at 6.
103. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It's
Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REv. 313, 353 (2014); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives
Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 549-54 (2011);
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participants to keep records of their transactions, the exposure of individual firms
was unknown even among regulators. As is now well-known, credit markets
froze as regulators scrambled to establish which firms were exposed to toxic
assets, undermining the health of even robust firms who could no longer find
funding.10 4 As the crisis deepened, government intervention did too, culminating
in the taxpayer-funded bailout of many institutions that had grown too-big-to-fail
with the repeal of Glass-Steagall."'5 The debacle would cost the U.S. economy
around twenty trillion dollars and a year's worth of GDP.° 6
The congressional response to the 2008 financial crisis-all 848 pages of it-
would be comprehensive, with the primary (and, according to some, sole) goal of
never again putting taxpayers in the position of bailing out private institutions.10 7
Among the many reforms introduced, a new rule, named after former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, was outlined that would limit and, in some
instances, prohibit bank holding companies from trading on their own money and
owning or investing in a hedge fund or private equity fund.10 8 This rule would, by
design, reintroduce the philosophical posture embraced in Glass-Steagall that
commercial banks should not be engaged in highly speculative activities. Banks
would also be subject to higher capital charges and prudential measures aimed at
minimizing the consequences of the failure of large financial institutions.109
Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1183
(2010).
104. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 103 (noting the challenge of getting fundamental
information during the Crisis); William D. Cohan, How Goldman Killed A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2011, 9:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/how-goldman-killed-a-i-g-and-
other-stories/? r=0 [https://perma.cc/VZ3N- 33J7].
105. Initially, commercial banks were the primary participants in brokering CDS counterparties,
though their roles were quickly eclipsed by investment banks when contracts were written for corporate
bonds, municipal bonds, and later, structured investment vehicles. See Richard R. Zabel, Credit Default
Swaps: From Protection to Speculation, ROBINS KAPLAN LLP (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.robinskaplan.
com/re sources/articles/credit-default- swaps- from-protection-to- speculation [https ://perma.cc/GW3 T-
7LQS].
106. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS
LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 1 (2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
651322.pdf; see also Eleazar David Melendez, Financial Crisis Cost Tops $22 Trillion, GAO Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013, 7:49 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/financial-
crisis-cost-gao n_2687553.html [https://perma.cc/8Z8S-LC5M] (stating that the total cost included the
toll on economic output of thirteen trillion dollars, wealth lost by homeowners of more than nine trillion
dollars, and losses associated with increased mortgage foreclosures and higher unemployment).
107. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)); see also The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18,
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547784 [https://perma.cc/5FRN-5PMX].
108. See Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). See generally Volcker Rule, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/volcker-rule.
hm [https://perma.cc/8PC8-NUPD] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (providing documents related to the
Volker rule).
109. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act: The Federal Reserve Board's Role, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-actiondates.htm [https://
perma.cc/SK8T-HPEA] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (highlighting the various regulatory policies
designed to enhance the prudential safety of banks).
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Meanwhile, the swaps markets would face a new regulatory regime, modeled
after the New Deal approach for futures contracts and designed to reign in OTC
derivatives. Most dealers (that is, intermediaries) in swaps would face new capital
rules. More derivative contracts would have to be standardized, with fewer
bespoke, bilateral deals between counterparties and greater reliance on a
common-set of terms to facilitate trading between parties.110 Importantly, these
standardized contracts would be put on regulated exchanges and subject to strict
risk management procedures.1 Transactions that continued to be executed off-
exchange would face penalties, and transactions would have to be reported as
part of prescriptive transacting recording requirements.' 12 To implement the
reforms, nearly 22,000 pages of regulatory content would subsequently be
written. 1 3
From both a legal and technical standpoint, Dodd-Frank's rules exhibited un-
precedented complexity.1 4 Some of this complexity was due to the fact that mul-
tiple regulators worked on the same or similar issues, creating distinct and at
110. Dodd-Frank Act § 731, 7 U.S.C. 6s (2012); § 764, 15 U.S.C. 78o-8 (2012).
111. Dodd-Frank Act § 723, 7 U.S.C. 2 (2012); § 763, 15 U.S.C. 78c-3 (2012).
112. Dodd-Frank Act § 727, 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(13)(G) (2012); § 731, 7 U.S.C. 6s (2012); § 764, 15 U.S.C.
78o-8 (2012).
113. See Arthur W.S. Duff & David Zaring, New Paradigms and Familiar Tools in the New
Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 677 (2013) (providing an overview of the rules on
derivatives mandated by Dodd-Frank); Data Recordkeeping, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM'N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/DF 17 Recordkeeping/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/8YJA-KFHU] (listing related rules implemented by the CFTC); Alan Pyke,
5 Numbers to Know as Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Celebrates Its 5th Birthday, THINKPROGRESS
(July 21, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/5-numbers-to-know-as-dodd-frank-wall-street-
reform -celebrates -its-5th-birthday-e145f4360b7c [https://perma.cc/V7KV-PX7K] (noting that 22,000
pages of regulatory content have been produced).
114. For example, the Volcker Rule was implemented by four federal agencies that put forward a
298-page proposal that included "383 explicit questions," which broke "down into 1,420 sub questions."
Stephen Simonis Senior, A Complex Overreaction .... Can You Say Dodd-Frank?, Fi. MAGNATES
(June 12, 2015, 16:06 GMT), http://www.financemagnates.com/institutional-forex/bloggers/a-complex-
overreaction-can-you-say-dodd-frank/ [https://perma.cc/74LA-E5EU]. The CFTC "then issued its own
proposal on prop[rietary] trading and it was no less that [sic] 489 pages long." Id.
Complexities and possible contradictions are also evident in the differing aims and policies of post-
crisis rules. For example, as noted here, a key focus of post-crisis regulation has been to improve the
safety and soundness of banks to ensure that they are less susceptible to failure and systemic crisis. In
addition, under the Dodd-Frank Act, there has also been a concerted effort to improve the welfare of
consumers and investors, notably through the creation of the CFPB. See Consumer Financial Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal
Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts, U.S. CONSUMER FiN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 8,
2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
fines -wells- fargo- 100-million-widespread -illegal -practice- secretly- opening-unauthorized-accounts/
[https://perma.cc/6W9F-ZBRK]. There can sometimes be considerable tension between consumer
protection and prudential banking regulation. To ensure consumer safety, banks have to invest in
compliance and are restricted in undertaking certain (potentially profitable) activities against consumers.
With lower profits and reduced cash flow, bank safety and soundness may be at risk. See LLEWELLYN,
supra note 25, at 7-11.
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times contradictory expectations.15 In other instances, complexity deepened as
obligatory notice-and-comment processes introduced nuance into otherwise
straightforward rules by informing rulemakers of stakeholder complaints and
nudging them to incorporate detailed formulas, alternative regulatory regimes,
and scales of regulatory intensity to accommodate voiced concerns. 1 6
Nevertheless, the sprawling amalgam of rules, critics argued, would harm the
financial system by making it less productive without any corresponding gain in
efficacy or safety.117 Meanwhile, regulatory complexity-and the uncertainties
caused by unsettled rules, carve-outs, and varied regulatory approaches between
countries-would give rise to more organizational complexity as firms adapted to
this new terrain. 1 8 Commentators suggested that these regulatory pressures
would prove overly expensive for banks as they sunk resources into compliance
rather than lending, triggering financial fragilities as firms became too complex
and costly to succeed.1 9
Still, these complaints, often voiced by global banks, attracted little sympathy
from policymakers or the wider public.1 20 In some respects, the rules had already
accommodated industry's deepest concerns. Regulators had taken a scalpel rather
than a hammer to the existing regulatory system, pruning instead of dismantling
and breaking up the largest banks.1 21 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank reforms
reflected a profound skepticism about the value of financial innovation in the
115. See, e.g., DAVISPOLK, COMPARISON OF U.S. PERSON DEFINITIONS, https://www.davispolk.com/
files/uploads/USpersondefinition.pdf (providing a comparison of SEC and CFTC definitions of person in
various rules and guidance).
116. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIz. L. REV. 53, 70 (2013).
117. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Keep It Simple, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/17/opinionbankings-got-a-new-critic.html? smid=pl- share [https://nyti.ms/2NG9tOK].
118. See John Kay, Complexity, Not Size, Is the Real Danger in Banking, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/5c2a416e-000f- 11e6-99cb-83242733f755?mhq5j=e2 [https://perma.cc/
J4TB-R6P5] (noting that "[a]s the size of the Dodd-Frank legislation shows, we have locked ourselves
into a spiral in which regulatory complexity gives rise to further organisational complexity and the
construction of yet more esoteric instruments" and therefore, "[e]ven if legislators had better motives
than the present corrupting structure that US campaign finance seems to allow, they cannot hope to have
more than a basic knowledge of the rules they promulgate or the workings of the regulatory institutions
they have created").
119. See Brian Peccarelli, Too Big to Fail? Try Too Complex to Manage, WORLD ECON. FORUM
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/too-big-to-fail-try-too-complex-to-manage/
[https://perma.cc/9PF7-75M2] ("The phenomenon has made compliance one of the fastest-growing
career categories and elevated the practice of navigating a constantly evolving, ever-expanding web of
regulatory requirements to an art form.").
120. See David Henry & Dan Bums, JPMorgan CEO Calls for Regulatory Changes in Shareholder
Letter, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-dimon-letter/
jpmorgan- ceo-calls -for-regulatory- changes -in- shareholder- letter-idUSKBN 17626T [https://perma.cc/
JFH5 -NSJ8]; Ben McLannahan, JPMorgan Finance Chief Calls for Easing of Bank Regulation, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/441be482-fdcb-Ile6-8d8e-a5e3738f9ae4 [https://
perma.cc/XUP6-T44L].
121. See Nathaniel Popper, JPMorgan Chase Insists It's Worth More as One Than in Pieces, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/business/dealbook/jpmorgan-pushes-
back-against- suggestion-of-split.html [https://nyti.ms/1EMM2Ev].
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mind of the public, and accorded an elevated importance to market integrity. In
the wake of the most perilous financial crisis since the Great Depression, financial
stability was paramount. Taxpayers were to be protected at all costs. Paul
Volcker lamented that no innovation had been more useful than the simple auto-
matic teller.122 Legislators were even more direct. Senator Elizabeth Warren
launched a campaign espousing the belief that "banking should be boring.
123
Complex rules, at least implicitly, were a means to achieving this goal.
D. THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION
Each of the major eras of financial oversight serves as a relatively straightfor-
ward illustration of the challenges the trilemma poses for regulators of dynamic
markets. 124 The Roaring 1920s represented a period dominated by an embrace of
the free market and, by implication, financial innovation. Regulators also opted
explicitly for rules simplicity. Few rules existed to constrain the conduct of finan-
cial firms. The impact of these twin policy objectives was, of course, financial
market instability. Investor confidence plummeted and hailed the coming of the
Great Depression.
The New Deal would represent a dramatic change in emphasis. Though
reforms would be cast as efforts to save capitalism from capitalists, the New
Deal's Progressive-Era policies would be very much against Wall Street and the
free-wheeling 1920s that encouraged excessive speculation. Market integrity
would become a priority. To achieve it, a deeply layered set of rules would be
developed-with increasing complexity. And even when rules were relatively
straightforward, as in the case of the Glass-Steagall Act, they took the form of
broad prohibitions against imaginative transactions by bank holding companies.
The New Deal consensus, however, began to erode as regulators and market
players responded to emerging technologies in the 1980s and 1990s by incremen-
tally relaxing rules or showing tolerance for pushing their boundaries.
Eventually, the deregulatory agenda of the 1990s, embodied by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act and the CFMA, featured for the first time an explicit reference
to financial innovation, and embraced it along with rules simplicity and market
integrity as important objectives. 12 Yet, despite the professed commitment to
122. See James Shepherd-Barron, Meet the True Star of Financial Innovation-the Humble ATM,
FIN. TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/052f9310-5738-11e7-80b6-9bfa4clf83d2
[https://perma.cc/FX3R-WG7C] (noting that Volcker commented "the ATM has been the only useful
innovation in banking for the past 20 years").
123. David Benoit, Elizabeth Warren: 'Banking Should Be Boring,' WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2013,
3:27 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/11/elizabeth-warren-banking-should-be-boring/
[https://perma.cc/W3X7-WVDQ]; see also Elizabeth Warren (@elizabethforma), TWITTER (July 11,
2013, 11:09 AM), https://twitter.com/elizabethforma/status/355388282261090304 [https://perma.cc/
9R2D-FRDD].
124. See supra Section I.B.
125. See, e.g., Walt Lukken, Reauthorization: Let the Debate Begin, 24 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L.
REP. 1, 3-4 (2004) (noting the explosion in innovative derivatives products being authorized for use in
the market following passage of the CFMA). On the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, rules simplicity, and
financial innovation, see generally Anthony M. Santomero, The Causes and Effects of Financial
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securing rules simplicity and market integrity as well as financial innovation, reg-
ulators could not achieve all three goals, and market integrity was ultimately sac-
rificed. Policymakers consciously withdrew the regulatory perimeter for banking
and derivatives, not fully knowing or understanding the full risks and consequen-
ces of their decision.
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act would represent a reassertion of market integrity
as an overriding policy priority. New rules would be introduced across financial
markets. One of the defining features would be complexity, and one of the stated
goals by its most vocal advocates would be the opposite of innovation-the
embrace of "boring"-in banking.
126
Figure two situates these legislative policy priorities and key pieces of imple-
menting regulation within the poles of the trilemma.
Financial Innovation
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Dodd-Frank
CFMA
Rules Market
Simplicity Integrity
Glass-Steagall
Figure 2: The Trilemma Model and Legislative Policy Priorities
This history provides important lessons for understanding policy formulation.
At defining moments of history and often in the name of economic growth, poli-
cymakers have dramatically eased financial rules and regulations to spur innova-
tion. However, new financing techniques and technologies-often entirely
deregulated and left unchecked-invariably created or enabled dangerous forms
of financial risk. When such risks have materialized and cascaded through entire
financial systems, policymakers have had to respond to inspire confidence in their
financial markets and prevent new crises from arising.
Of course, one might explain such shifts in the regulatory pendulum as just
that: shifts that above all reflect immediate political preferences. 127 From this
Modernization, Q4 2001 Bus. REV. FED. RES. BANK PHIA. 1, 2-4, https://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/
research-and-data/publications/business-review/2001/q4/brq40las.pdf.
126. See Benoit, supra note 123.
127. See, e.g., ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013).
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standpoint, financial regulation, like the economy, is cyclical and both financial
regulation and the economy stand in counterpoise to another. When economies
heat up, rules tend to take a back seat. When crisis then occurs, more intrusive
(and onerous) rules emerge as a response as voters demand punishment for some
the bad acts or negligence that enabled the crisis.
The history of financial regulation, however, allows for more nuance. Shifts in
policy can be viewed not only as responses to exogenous changes in national eco-
nomics, but also as responses to previous policies captured by the trilemma and
the trade-offs generated by them. In short, when financial innovation runs amok,
a higher emphasis on market integrity arises. To the extent that there is rules sim-
plicity, it comes in the form of rote prohibitions that in turn, as our model pre-
dicts, stifle innovation. Alternatively, when policy choices seek to promote both
market integrity and innovation, rules are invariably more complex as more
nuance is built into governing administrative regimes.
II. WHAT IS (AND ISN'T) NEW ABOUT FINTECH
So far our discussion of the trilemma has looked backwards. But what do its
workings mean for the present and future of financial innovation? Commentators
routinely state that modern-day fintech is not particularly new, but rather a contin-
uation of the story of financial and technological innovation captured in part by
the preceding analysis. 12 In this Part, we dispute such conclusions and argue that
today's fintech is in fact different. Far from being more of the same, present-day
fintech possesses its own set of distinctive features that exacerbate the historic
trade-offs inhabiting the trilemma and necessitate a fresh approach to oversight.
We focus on three key features of modern fintech that differentiate it from ear-
lier eras of financial markets and technological innovation: (i) a dependence on
vast quantities of conventional as well as novel types of data in the design of fin-
tech products; (ii) the automation of algorithmic programs that often showcase
advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning; and (iii) the
emergence of nontraditional, specialist firms whose business models seek to dis-
intermediate financial transactions and take on the dominance of brand-name
"one-stop shop" Wall Street firms. These three features together define modern
fintech and, as we will see, exacerbate the trade-offs inherent in the trilemma.
The goal of this Part is to connect past innovation with present-day fintech
as a basis for analyzing the effectiveness of responses to regulate it. In identify-
ing the use of big data, automation/Al, and the pervasiveness of nontraditional
firms as key actors, we highlight brand new risks facing regulators that mani-
fest in deep information asymmetries, an uncertain impact on market integrity,
and-as a result-real difficulties in seeking to regulate through clear and sim-
ple rules.
128. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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A. BIG (AND NEW KINDS OF) DATA
Financial innovation has always involved advances in information gathering
and processing, a point highlighted in Part I's overview of the explosion of securi-
tization and OTC derivatives. 129 Securitization requires gathering and compiling
swaths of borrower data to create pools of loans that generate cash flows for bond
investors. Similarly, CDSs rely on tools to aggregate and model data about the
credit risk of referenced loans.130 Today's fintech, not surprisingly, also relies on
information-but exponentially more so.131 Moreover, the kind of information on
which it relies is qualitatively more heterogeneous and diverse.
13 2
A key driver behind the recent explosion of data is the advent of the Internet
and the concomitant growth of computing power.133 Not only is more information
stored online but the pace of data creation and its rapid availability to those seek-
ing it has accelerated exponentially.134 Importantly, unlike in earlier decades,
when information on underlying loans or mortgage-backed securities was
sourced through central nodes of information-such as credit rating agencies or
conventional news organizations-today the production of digital data is often
decentralized. Specifically, data emerges from a diffuse proliferation of websites,
social media, and various genres of news sources and databases.135 It is also the
129. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 1-2 (2014). See generally Salon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (noting the explosion of data in everyday life because of the Internet and
highlighting the potential discriminatory effects of data mining); Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., From FinTech
to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance (Eur. Banking Inst., Working Paper
No. 6, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2959925 [https://perma.cc/LW3B-
QRT2] (noting the ability of fintech firms to leverage data for their own business uses).
130. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 83, at 3-12 (discussing the "seven key frictions"
involved in the securitization process as well as the failure of actors to properly collect information in
the run-up to the 2008 crisis); U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 28 (2011); Mark J. Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit
Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 2085, 2086-95 (2010); see also Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 664-70
(1999).
131. See HE ET AL., supra note 19, at 7-8.
132. See DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., ALTERNATIVE DATA FOR INVESTMENT DECISIONS:
TODAY'S INNOVATION COULD BE TOMORROW'S REQUIREMENT 4-9 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us -fsi -dcfs -alternative -data- for- investment-
decisions.pdf.
133. See Data and Analytics in Financial Services, PwC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/
financial- services/research-institute/top-issues/data-analytics.html [https://perma.cc/NB5F-XU2Z]; see
also Analytics Activators for Financial Services, Bos. CONSULTING GRP., https://www.bcg.com/
industries/financial-institutions/center-digital- financial- services/analytics-activators.aspx [https://perma.
cc/XRP5-AH4S].
134. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 129, at 673-74 (listing ways in which "Big Data" can be used).
135. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 19-25 (2015); ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE:
RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 1-11 (2013).
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product of more sources of data, from mobile technologies to satellites and
drones. 36
The growing availability of new and seemingly limitless quantities of data is
enhanced by the structural assistance of what is conventionally referred to as
the "cloud. 13 7 Cloud storage allows large volumes of information to be stored
cheaply on external, third-party, Internet-based servers. Instead of buying servers-
which occupy physical space and necessitate maintenance expenses-to store
data on-premises, firms can look to specialist third party providers of cloud stor-
age to perform this all-important function for them. By storing data digitally in
the cloud, users can generate and synthesize new data unimaginable a generation
ago.
1 38
Potentially consolidating these advances structurally is blockchain, or distributed-
ledger technology. Designed to enable the sharing and verification of data between a
network of actors, blockchains represent operating systems that allow information
to be organized within "block[s]" or "ledger[s]" of transaction data that can facilitate
digital representation of entitlements and ownership. 
139
A key innovation of blockchain systems lies in their capacity to decentralize
the process by which information about transactions is collected and verified.
Conventional methods of collecting data typically look to a central player-such
as an exchange or a bank-to collect a batch of data, verify it, and vouch for its
accuracy. Using blockchain, however, the need for this central intermediary can
be reduced. Blockchain operating systems can be programmed to collect certain
data from users (for example, date of birth and password), to check this data
against established parameters (for example, stored information about users'
birthdays and passwords), and to then green-light the transaction when this data
is verified as authentic. 40 As users enter required information into the system to
begin a transaction (for example, to send a payment), multiple such transaction
requests are organized into blocks or batches, verified, and then accepted into the
"ledger," or the definitive record of approved transactions for the payment
136. See Rob Mannix & Luke Smolinski, Quant Funds Look Past the Obvious for Uses of Alternative
Data, RISK (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.risk.net/asset-management/5357531/quant-funds-look-past-
the-obvious-for-uses-of-alternative-data [https://perma.cc/A7EQ-MYQW] (noting that data can be
"gleaned from social media, mobile apps, business records, satellites and drones").
137. See FORESIGHT, U.K. GOV'T OFFICE FOR ScI., THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 30-32 (2012) (highlighting the essential role of
cloud computing and its ability to sharply lower the costs of storing and accessing data).
138. See Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2018)
(noting difficulties entailed in the international regulation of sharing data through the cloud); Michael
Fimin, Emerging Cloud Trends in the Financial Sector: Cloud Adoption Soars, Yet Security Concerns
Remain, FINTECH WEEKLY (Apr. 13. 2017), https://magazine.fintechweekly.com/magazine/articles/
emerging -cloud -trends -in-the- financial- sector- cloud- adoption- soars -yet- security- concerns -remain
[https://perma.cc/66RM-9MFS].
139. See, e.g., Mike Orcutt, Why America's Biggest Bank Digs Cryptocurrency, MIT TECH. REV.
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609481/why-americas-biggest-bank-digs-
anonymous -cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/Z389 -CYYP].
140. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENT CLEARING
AND SETTLEMENT: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 4 (2017), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf.
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system.141 In this way, the need for a "central" bank as data collector and verifier
is diminished. Instead, the system operates in a decentralized manner, allowing
for data to be entered by multiple users and for the system to essentially automate
the checking and approval process.
14 2
When such operating systems are decentralized, no one person monopolizes ei-
ther data entry or verification. Instead, the creation and integrity of information
on the blockchain is continuously validated by networked computers in accord-
ance with a preset protocol and secured using cryptography. Whenever a new
"block" of transactional data is introduced into the network-for example, to
make a funds transfer between users in a payment system-previous data entries
are updated as long as this information passes the blockchain's verification
protocols.143
Collectively these developments are enabling the production of not only more
data than in the past, but also new kinds of metadata and secondary data not previ-
ously accessible (or in existence). Fintech firms can scour the Internet, including
social media as well as cellphone records, for insight into customers. Cloud soft-
ware applications can help create secondary data based on the analysis and min-
ing of original data. Further, by introducing networked communities, blockchains
present the possibility of qualitatively new metadata based on the verifications
performed on original data and its analytics. 4
In principle, these developments offer a range of benefits. With this variety and
bulk of data capable of being accessed and stored (subject, of course, to applica-
ble rules governing data collection and privacy), regulators and firms should have
nuanced insight into markets. Finance firms are no longer restricted to collecting
conventional types of hard data, such as a prospective borrower's income or debt.
Rather, they can rely on these data points as well as a host of more diffuse and
new informational sources-for example, a borrower's record of social media
141. See id. at 2-9.
142. See id. This description is a very basic summary of distributed ledger technology (DLT) and
much more can be written in relation to the benefits, risks, and effectiveness of such systems for various
types of transactions (for example, payments and securities settlement). Proposed blockchain systems
can be private or public to varying degrees. See id. at 7. For example, a private blockchain system may
only give access to a defined set of users and may rely on a firm (like a bank) to administer it and be
liable for any errors. By contrast, certain blockchain systems, notably those underlying Bitcoin, are
public and quintessentially decentralized where the system is designed to operate without a central
authority to be responsible for the integrity of the system. For further description and analysis, see id.
143. See Zach Church, Blockchain, Explained, MIT DIGITAL (May 29, 2017), http://ide.mit.edu/
news -blog/blog/blockchain-explained [https://perma.cc/649L-N86P]. In a funds transfer, once the data
is checked by the network, one user's account will show a debit entry and another's a credit by the same
amount. In this way, corrupt data at point "A" cannot become part of the chain because it will not match
up with the equivalent data at points "B" and "C." Once verified, the new record is then reviewable by
everyone within the network and can be made immutable to provide certainty. See id.
144. See INT'L COMM. ON CREDIT REPORTING, USE OF ALTERNATIVE DATA TO ENHANCE CREDIT
REPORTING TO ENABLE ACCESS TO DIGITAL FINANCE SERVICES By INDIVIDUALS AND SMEs OPERATING
IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY (2018), https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/documentosproducidos/
use of alternative data to enhance credit reporting-to enable access to digital financial services-
iccr.pdf. For these reasons banks and other financial institutions have increasing interest in the potential
of blockchain technologies. See Orcutt, supra note 139.
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use or online purchases.145 Aided by information contained in devices such as
cellphones or tablets, online lenders can discern customer behavior using apps
and convenient online interfaces.146 With more data to offer, borrowers that may
once have been shunned from credit markets might now see themselves more
fully included within the financial system. Simply relying on FICO scores or
established credit histories might exclude communities that have historically
lacked access to credit or financial services. A broader and more diverse set of
data-including a user's social contacts or shopping habits-may allow opportu-
nities to foster greater inclusion in credit markets. 
14 7
A thicker informational market can also lead to efficient outcomes for regula-
tors. Instead of struggling to obtain information from paper-based dealings, cash
transactions, or face-to-face interactions, digital records offer a better means of
preserving data about financial transactions and surveilling markets for illegal or
risky dealings.14 8 Furthermore, digital information sources lend themselves to
being collated, computed, and modeled as a basis for understanding the state of
the market and predicting future risk.
But there are also reasons for caution. For one, finding statistical connections
and meaning within large datasets is far from straightforward, and regulators and
market participants can face high analytical costs in cleaning, collating, interpret-
ing, and handling vast stores of data.149 These costs, particularly for resource-
constrained regulators, can motivate supervisors to rely on those they supervise
for insight into data mining and interpretation, raising obvious concerns of
capture. 150
145. See Tammer Kamel, Alternative Data-The Developing Trend in Financial Data, QUANDL
BLOG (Apr. 12, 2016), https://blog.quandl.com/alternative-data [https://perma.cc/2792-BX5H]. There is
enormous debate and ongoing discussion regarding the capacity of firms to collect and share detailed
data about consumers. See, e.g., Sherisse Pham, Facebook Defends Sharing User Data with Phone
Makers, CNN (June 4, 2018, 12:18 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/04/technology/facebook-
apple-samsung-blackberry/index.html [https://perma.cc/MT7E-YCZ3]; Olivia Solon, How Europe's
'Breakthrough' Privacy Law Takes on Google and Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2018, 3:01 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/19/gdpr- facebook-google-amazon-data-privacy-regulation
[https://perma.cc/9E8V-XDP6].
146. See Charles Lane, Will Using Artificial Intelligence to Make Loans Trade One Kind of Bias for
Another?, NPR (Mar. 31, 2017, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/03/31/
52194621 0/will-using- artificial -intelligence-to-make loans -trade -one -kind -of-bias -for-anot [https://
perma.cc/HH4Z-MVYN].
147. See, e.g., Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk
Pricing, andAlternative Information 1, 7-17 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17,
2017) https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2017/
wpl7-17.pdf (noting the potential for alternative data to improve financial inclusion).
148. See Kamel, supra note 145.
149. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 129 (describing how the proliferation of data and
data mining can have discriminatory effects).
150. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 317, 317-21 (2008) (discussing the use of private "data brokers" to collect data as part of intensive
data mining); see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The Constitutional Limits of Private Surveillance, 66
KAN. L. REv. 485 (2018) (discussing the "fusion of private surveillance and public law enforcement" as
enforcement becomes increasingly data-driven).
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Alternatively, digital datsets can lead to disparate and even unfair outcomes for
would-be clients and customers. Historically disadvantaged minority commun-
ities, for example, could fare worse, not better, under some analytical systems de-
pendent on longstanding records of using banking and insurance services.l
Where the availability of data is limited due to the de jure or de facto exclusion of
such subgroups from credit systems, some lending algorithms may infer that
higher interest rates and tighter credit conditions are warranted, and impose such
terms accordingly. Such communities may also find themselves especially vulner-
able to invasions of privacy and the accessing of sensitive data.
15 2
Information can also be inaccurate. "Fake news" on the Internet can be rapidly
impounded, without verification, into the total mix of data consumed by the mar-
ket and analytical models. Data generated from websites, blogs, and social media
can be incorrect, fraudulent, or ambiguous. 5 3 When disinformation filters into
data gathering processes, it taints their quality and reliability. As a result, data
sourced from the web can ultimately cause faulty analysis, even when powerful
technological tools and verification mechanisms are brought to bear, a point we
will revisit below.
1 5 4
B. FROM AUTOMATION TO MACHINE LEARNING
A second signature feature of fintech lies in the increasing prevalence and cen-
trality of automation and machine learning. Algorithms-or programmed
151. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 147, at 9.
152. See id.; see also Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 100-05 (2014)
(discussing regulatory controversies in relation to the relative protectiveness of data privacy regimes);
Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the Era of FinTech (Working Paper, Oct.
2018), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/papers/discrim.pdf. Jurisdictions can vary in the
intensity of the protection accorded to personal data. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes
Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html [https://nyti.ms/21EdwdX] (discussing a 2018
California law granting customers greater rights to control their digital data).
The literature and analysis in this area is vast. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, A COMPARISON
BETWEEN US AND EU DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2015), http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536459/IPOLSTU(2015)536459_EN.pdf (discussing
divergences between the E.U. and U.S. privacy regimes); Lucy Handley, US Companies Are Not Exempt
from Europe's New Data Privacy Rules-And Here's What They Need to Do About It, CNBC (Apr. 25,
2018, 5:43 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/25/gdpr-data-privacy-rules-in-europe-and-how-they-
apply-to-us -companies.html [https://perma.cc/JDS2- SHDK].
153. See, e.g., Alina Selyukh, Hackers Send Fake Market-Moving AP Tweet on White House
Explosions, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2013, 1:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-usa-whitehouse-
ap/hackers- send- fake-market-moving-ap-tweet-on-white-house-explosions-idUSBRE93M12Y20130423
[https://perma.cc/RR72-LCMK].
154. See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Outsourcing, Data Insourcing, and the Irrelevant Constitution,
49 GA. L. REV. 607, 609-15, 620-21, 632-33 (2015) (describing the practice of "data insourcing" in the
context of the reliance placed by government authorities on private firms); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 PA. L. REV. 327, 331-36 (2015) (discussing how
the use of data by law enforcement "undermines the protection that reasonable suspicion provides
against police stops and potentially transforms reasonable suspicion into a means of justifying those
same stops").
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computerized instructions-form the operational basis for financial products that
exhibit high degrees of automation and artificial intelligence (Al) in their
workings."'
Automation has long been a key goal in the delivery of financial services.
Since the 1970s, market participants have relied on algorithms to enable greater
speed and sophistication and to increase automation in their transactions.15 6 The
rise of the Internet, digitization, big data, and computational power has facilitated
an unprecedented flourishing of algorithms in markets, newly bringing Al and
machine learning to financial transactions and decisionmaking.15 7 Using Al, algo-
rithms now routinely perform tasks and produce outcomes that appear "smart,"
mimicking humanlike feats of logic and deduction.15 8 This "intelligence" has
deepened over time as algorithms have become adept at processing natural lan-
guage, images (for example, faces), and attaching meaning to data.15 9
The emergence of a subset of algorithms that specialize in machine learning
enhanced this development. Such learning algorithms are defined by their
capacity to decompose and organize large swaths of data, derive patterns from
155. See THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5-6 (3d ed. 2009)
("Informally, an algorithm is any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of
values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output. An algorithm is thus a sequence of
computational steps that transform the input into the output."); John Bates, Algorithmic Trading and
High Frequency Trading: Experiences from the Market and Thoughts on Regulatory Requirements, in
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, TECH. ADVISORY COMM., TECHNOLOGICAL TRADING IN
THE MARKETS (2010) http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/tac_071410_
binder.pdf ("An algorithm is 'a sequence of steps to achieve a goal."'); see also FORESIGHT, supra note
137, at 19-38; JEFFREY G. MACINTOSH, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADERS: ANGELS OR DEVILS? 2-8 (2013),
https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research papers/mixed/Commentary-391 0.pdf
(describing how "high frequency trading," or "the use of extremely high speed computers and automated
trading algorithms to trade high volumes of stock at lightning speed," works and how it has "transformed
world capital markets"); CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 10-13 (2016) (discussing the extensive reliance on
algorithms in finance and ordinary life).
156. See, e.g., Joel Hasbrouck et al., New York Stock Exchange Systems and Trading Procedures
(N.Y. Stock Exch., Working Paper No. 93-01, 1993), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/Research/
Working%20Papers/NYSE.PDF (discussing the NYSE's use of an automated ordering system-the
Designated Order Turnaround (DOT)-in the 1970s and the evolution of its order entry and
processing systems in the 1990s); Machine -Learning Promises to Shake Up Large Swathes of
Finance, THE ECONOMIST (May 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/
2017/05/25/machine-learning-promises -to- shake -up-large- swathes -of-finance [https://perma.cc/S5F5-
KFB7] [hereinafter Machine-Learning Promises] (noting that "[m]achine-learning is already much used
for tasks such as compliance, risk management and fraud prevention"); Bob Pisani, Man vs. Machine:
How Stock Trading Got So Complex, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2010, 6:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/
38978686 [https://perma.cc/T4EC-PMWR] (describing the timeline of the NYSE moving from DOT to
SuperDot).
157. See U.S. FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 3-7 (2017), http://www.
fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/PO I11 17.pdf.
158. See id. at4-5.
159. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45 (2015)
(discussing the impact of robotics and artificial intelligence on reshaping legal paradigms); Ryan Calo,
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 514-20 (2015) (noting how robotics
challenges core concepts and machinations of the law).
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this information, and gradually "learn" over time from the quality of the outputs
they produce.160 In effect, machine-learning algorithms are programmed to repro-
gram themselves over time in response to new data and the external validation
garnered by their performance.16 1 Using data and ever cheaper access to high-
quality computational power, machine-learning algorithms can apply sophisti-
cated models and processing techniques (for example, neural networks) to
achieve informed, creative, and precise results. 16 2 With algorithms capable of
evaluating the quality of their actions and adjusting their performance to reflect
new data, automation becomes possible without the need for real-time human
intervention.163
Al and machine learning are quickly reshaping and reimagining financial serv-
ices. For example, they have gained a deep foothold in automating the processes
by which securities are bought and sold. Although the trading process has long
relied on technology (for example, the NYSE's central quotation system), Al has
enabled technology to almost fully automate the trading process. Trading firms
rely on preprogrammed algorithms to make real-time, trade-by-trade determina-
tions about what to buy and sell-in increments measured in milliseconds and
microseconds.16 4 Showcasing degrees of Al, high-frequency trading algorithms
respond dynamically to changing market conditions as prices for stocks and
bonds constantly adjust to new information on a millisecond-by-millisecond ba-
sis."' High-frequency trading (HFT) is now ubiquitous, responsible for around
fifty to seventy percent of equity trading by volume, sixty percent of futures, and
160. See U.S. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 157, at 4.
161. See id. at 4-5; Steven Levy, How Google Is Remaking Itself as a "Machine Learning First"
Company, WIRED (June 22, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/how-google-is-
remaking-itself-as-a-machine-learning-first-company/ [https://perma.cc/D9XD-L24G]; see also Ryan
Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 399,405-10 (2017).
162. See Calo, supra note 161, at 405. Neural nets, for example, refer to a data processing technique
that deploys programming that mimics the layered thinking utilized by human brains. See Levy, supra
note 161. For further discussion of the use of machine learning and deep learning, see Richard Waters,
Techmate: How A/ Rewrote the Rules of Chess, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
ea707a24-f6b7-1 le7-8715-e94187b3017e [https://perma.cc/W5H8-8K24].
163. See, e.g., Erin Winick, Lawyer-Bots Are Shaking Up Jobs, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609556/lawyer-bots-are-shaking-up-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/
VWK3 -D3M7] (describing how "Al-powered document discovery tools" have the capacity to "learn to
flag the appropriate sources a lawyer needs to craft a case, often more successfully than humans").
164. See MACINTOSH, supra note 155, at 3-7; see also INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, REGULATORY
ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY:
CONSULTATION REPORT 10 (2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD354.pdf.
165. According to a study by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 99.6% of
trading messages for share trading on Australian markets originated from automated trading systems.
See AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, DARK LIQUIDITY AND HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 73 (2013), https://
download.asic.gov.au/media/1344182/rep33 1 -published- 18-March-2013.pdf; see also Michael Kearns
& Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market Microstructure and High-Frequency Trading, in
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 91, 122-23 (David Easley, Marcos Lopez de Prado & Maureen O'Hara eds.,
2013) (highlighting the rise of machine learning in high-frequency trading).
2019]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 107:235
over fifty percent of trading by volume in the all-important U.S. Treasuries
market.
166
Indeed, in today's markets, Al is being engineered into cryptographic, distrib-
uted ledger (or blockchain) operating systems to amplify their usefulness.
Cryptocurrencies are building Al into their protocols to offer users a means of
automating payments and transferring value in accordance with instructions that
users can tailor and preprogram. For example, the Ethereum platform-using the
virtual currency "Ether"-showcases an express ambition to situate its value-
transfer mechanism within the operation of so-called "smart contracts. '167 Users
can preprogram smart contracts to specify the exact conditions under which a
payment in Ether should occur. For example, a smart contract might codify an
agreement between users for one to transfer value to another in relation to a
defined event (for example, after purchasing a car). A smart contract could be
programmed to connect to data within the Ethereum blockchain (for example, in-
formation that certifies the proof of car purchase) and automatically transfer pay-
ment in Ether between users once this condition is met and verified. Indeed, users
might program smart contracts to settle a position on the price of a certain asset
(for example, wheat or Google shares), necessitating that smart contracts use Al
for stock market data collection and analysis.1 68 It remains early days for this
kind of Al-based virtual currency system. But beyond aiming to simply transfer
value, the extension of Al into virtual payment systems aspires to automate the
166. See RINA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
OVERVWW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf; Michael
Mackenzie, High Frequency Trading Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (July 28, 2009) https://www.ft.com/
content/d5fa0660-7b95-1 ilde-9772-00144feabdcO [https://perma.cc/8ZT4-Y7HL] (noting that HFT
equity volume was over seventy percent).
The definition of what constitutes HFT is notoriously imprecise. The SEC, for example, points to
certain identifying factors, including: use of "extraordinarily" high speeds for executing and routing
trades, close location between exchanges and servers of trading firms, and very short time frames for
holding positions. See STAFF OF DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, EQUITY
MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: PART II: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 4-5 (2014), https://
www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft lit review march_2014.pdf; see also FORESIGHT, supra
note 137, at 27-38; MACINTOSH, supra note 155, at 2-7; Alexander Osipovich, Algorithmic Trading in
Energy Markets: A Different Ball Game, RISK (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.risk.net/risk-management/
2136141/algorithmic-trading-energy-markets [https://perma.cc/W2GL-E22F]; Philip Stafford et al.,
NASDAQ Sets Stage for HFT in Treasuries, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/
6e0ac4de-9d08-1 le2-a8db-00 144feabdcO [https://perma.cc/T4UD-A3JY].
167. See A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, GITHUB
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White -Paper [https://perma.cc/E9PN-K43K] (last visited Oct.
29, 2018). In this way, Ethereum's aspiration to allow programmable smart contracts in tailored
ways distinguishes it from Bitcoin, which primarily focuses on automating the transfer of value. See
Alyssa Hertig, How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/
information/ethereum -smart-contracts -work/ [https://perma.cc/9X5E-NA4V] (last visited Oct. 29,
2018). For discussion on smart contracts and the application of contract law theory, see Usha R.
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2018-07, 2018)
(noting that smart contracts may fail to reflect the reality of incomplete contracting).
168. See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 316-20
(2017) (discussing the role of smart contract in blockchain-based systems).
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codification, verification, and settlement of a broad variety of everyday
transactions.169
Al is also transforming financial functions such as retail investments and
credit. Robo advising businesses like Betterment, discussed in the Introduction to
this Article, emphasize and leverage their expertise in Al and machine learning to
help clients allocate savings.170 These kinds of digital advisors deploy algorithms
to crunch client information and risk preferences to allocate their capital to the
most suitable investment opportunities. Al can be applied to collect and parse
data and to analyze past performance and investment strategies to allocate cus-
tomer funds, harnessing computational ability beyond the capacity of human pro-
fessionals acting alone.171 Although still relatively nascent and representing only
a small slice of the overall investment advisory market, robo advisory firms are
seeing rapid growth and increasing visibility. 
172
Similarly, algorithms are showcasing an ever greater capacity to collect and
analyze big data in credit markets. 173 Al algorithms cast a broad net to catch a
much larger (and often nonstandard) variety of data points than those used by ear-
lier generations of lenders. As observed above, Al algorithms track, for example,
169. Shortcomings and risks have been noted in the operation of smart contracts-for example, in
relation to incentivizing "automated" fraudulent schemes. See, e.g., Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack
Just Showed That the DAO Was All Too Human, WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.
com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-showed-dao-human/ [https://perma.cc/4NAX-H4K7] (describing a
damaging Ether hack); Izabella Kaminska, It's Not Just a Ponzi, It's a 'Smart' Ponzi, FIN. TIMES:
ALPHAVILLE (June 1, 2017, 8:42 AM), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/06/O1/2189634/its-not-just-a-
ponzi-its -a- smart-ponzi/ [https://perma.cc/M47V-GNCX].
170. See Dan Egan, Get All the Returns You Deserve, BETTERMENT (May 10, 2018), https://www.
betterment.com/resources/investment- strategy/investor-returns/ [https ://perma.cc/7SYK-CSIN].
171. Cf. id.
172. See BARBARA NOVICK ET AL., BLACKROCK, DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBo ADVISORS
COME OF AGE (2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-
investment-advice-september-2016.pdf (noting that although "digital advisors represent a very small
segment relative to more traditional financial advice providers, their recent rapid growth suggests a need
for a focused analysis of the business and activities of these advisors"); Arielle O'Shea & Anna-Louise
Jackson, Best Robo-Advisors: 2018 Top Picks, NERDWALLET (Jan 9, 2018), https://www.nerdwallet.
com/blog/investing/best-robo-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/D8QQ-SZ5S] (compiling a list of the top robo
advisors); see also Gary Brackenridge, Machine Learning is Transforming Investment Strategies for
Asset Managers, CNBC (June 6, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/06/machine-learning-
transforms-investment-strategies-for-asset-managers.html [https://perma.cc/49L5-CT9T]; Nishant
Kumar, How AI Will Invade Every Corner of Wall Street, BLOOMBERO (Dec. 5, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017 -12 -05/how- ai -will -invade -every- corner- of- wall -street
[https://perma.cc/XN2W-P4FV]; Machine-Learning Promises, supra note 156. For an overview of the
increase of robo advisory firms and corresponding challenges in the European financial sector, see
EUROPEAN COMM'N, FINTECH: A MORE COMPETITIVE AND INNOVATIVE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SECTOR
7-8 (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-fintech-consultation-document-en O.pdf, and
EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., EBA RESPONSE TO THE EC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ON FINTECH: A
MORE COMPETITIVE AND INNOVATIVE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 1-4 (2017), http://www.eba.
europa.eu/documents/10180/187341/EBA+response+to+the+European+Commission+Consultation+
Document+on+FinTech+-+June+2017.pdf. For additional analysis of the risks and benefits of robo
advising, see Baker & Dellaert, supra note 13.
173. See generally Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 147 (discussing the impact of fintech lenders in
credit markets).
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a borrower's social media, contacts, personal habits (including esoteric variables
such as punctuation quality in text messages), hobbies, SAT scores, and shopping
preferences. Some digital lenders require borrowers to download an app to their
cellphone whose algorithms can collect the vast reserves of stored data in the de-
vice (for example, social contacts). 174 Capturing this multiplicity of "alternative
data" is made possible by the aid of algorithms that can track and parse this infor-
mation across sources, draw out patterns, and determine the best course of action
to take based on programming and past learning. 
175
Collectively, these developments suggest a not-too-distant future in which Al
becomes capable of directly connecting Main Street lending to the rarified world
of Wall Street financial engineering discussed in Part II. Past eras of innovation
witnessed the growth of securitization and credit default swaps linked to commer-
cial loans and mortgage-backed securities. Bankers (using spreadsheets and com-
putation, certainly) analyzed home or auto loan data to decide which loans to
package into investment vehicles. Looking ahead, Al algorithms might determine
the borrowers to whom bankers lend (using alternative data discussed above).
Based on the likelihood of repayment and anticipated future cash flows, algo-
rithms may then suggest what kinds of credit protection bankers ought to buy.
Indeed, Al can more fully automate the processes by which banks hedge the risks
of their loan book. Noting what kinds of loans a bank is funding (for example,
mortgages), algorithms can take steps to find and purchase the most optimal
instruments with which to hedge this risk (for example, interest rate swaps or
credit default swaps).176 Outside of risk management, Al might also allocate sur-
plus cash flows from these bank loans to invest in potentially profitable ventures
(for example, to invest in commercial real estate or emerging market debt).177
But Al and machine-learning algorithms also raise dangers for markets. First,
the proper workings of algorithms depend on the input of clear, correct, and cod-
able data. When algorithms access informational sources (like alternative data)
that are ambiguous, falsified, or overly noisy, their output will be tainted by error
and thus unreliable. 178 Moreover, automation means that the impact of such mis-
firing can spread widely as algorithms respond automatically to new information.
174. See U.S. FiN. STABRITY BD., supra note 157, at 12-13; Lane, supra note 146.
175. According to one estimate, there may be around 2,000 digital lending startups in the credit
market, a portion of which use artificial intelligence and machine learning to work. Lane, supra note
146.
176. For a discussion of swaps and securitization, see generally supra notes 81-86 and
accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Katy Burne, ICE Launches Electronic Trading Network for Credit-Default Swaps,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2014, 1:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ice-launches-electronic-trading-
network-for-creditdefault- swaps- 1390845869 [https://perma.cc/3DT4-UVG7].
178. See, e.g., Peter Foster, "Bogus" AP Tweet About Explosion at the White House Wipes Billions
off US Markets, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 23, 2013, 6:38 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
markets/10013768/Bogus-AP-tweet-about-explosion-at-the-White-House-wipes-billions-off-US -markets.
html [https://perma.cc/E6TJ-Q77U]; Renae Merle, How "Fake News" is Affecting Trading Algorithms,
CNBC (July 5, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2017/07/05/how-fake-news-is-affecting-
trading-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/7H4F-3MG4].
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Without checking the veracity of data or waiting for real-time human verification,
automated algorithms can cause the amplification of bad information when used
by multiple programs or perhaps in smart contracts. 
179
Second, Al and machine-learning programs are only as good as the quality and
completeness of their programming. When this programming is deficient or vul-
nerable to error, costs will inevitably accrue. Notably, algorithms may struggle to
respond to market environments that are not anticipated by their programming or
when there is insufficient data for an algorithm to arrive at credible predictions. If
markets are in turmoil, as exemplified by Betterment, automated algorithms may
either be forced to withdraw from the market or risk generating suboptimal or
damaging results from their operations.180 In such cases, their performance may
end up exacerbating crises rather than facilitating efficiencies in the market.181
Finally, complex Al and machine-learning algorithms impose high informa-
tional costs on regulators. Understanding the opaque "self-learning" processes
of machine-learning algorithms presents a significant hurdle for policymakers
seeking to craft regulatory measures to control the risks such technology might
generate. Given the potential for automation to result in widespread, cascading
costs, mapping the likely performance of sophisticated algorithms becomes
especially necessary. When this task is computationally difficult or overly
costly, regulators will be left with poorly adapted tools with which to tackle the
dangers.
C. (DIS-)INTERMEDIATION OF INCUMBENT FIRMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
The final distinguishing feature of fintech is not so much what it does, but how
it does it. Unlike earlier eras during which innovation was often driven by estab-
lished incumbents, fintech often gives a leading role to small, startups whose pri-
mary expertise can sometimes reside in tech rather than finance. 18 2 In 2015 alone,
U.S. fintech firms received investments of around $27 billion out of approxi-
mately $47 billion disbursed globally, highlighting the profit potential of finance
as an industry ripe for "disruption" by tech.183 In other words, it looked like inno-
vative technologies could generate better efficiencies than those being offered by
traditional financial firms. 184 This centrality of "outsider" firms contrasts sharply
179. See Alain P. Chaboud et al., Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign
Exchange Market, 69 J. FIN. 2045 (2014) (noting that HFT algorithms can amplify price impact in the
foreign exchange market); Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial
Markets (Jan. 1, 2015) (unpunished manuscript) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2173247 [https://perma.cc/538Y-37HQ] (noting that HFT markets are efficient at spreading
information, including the impact of erroneous data).
180. See Wursthorn & Tergesen, supra note 9.
181. See infra Section II.D.
182. See Douglas W. Amer et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO.
J. INT'L LAW 1271 (2016).
183. KPMG, THE PULSE OF FINTECH Q4 2016: GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT IN FINTECH 5-9
(2017) (noting that investment in fintech fell in 2016 owing potentially to political uncertainties as well
as perceived saturation of investment in payments and blockchain technologies).
184. See generally id.
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with the historical dominance of brand-name Wall Street firms being the main
movers in financial innovation, a state of affairs evident not only in the specula-
tion of the 1920s, but also the derivatives markets of the 1990s and 2000s.18
The ability of startups to compete with larger established counterparts stems
from some of the dynamics and core features of fintech discussed earlier in sec-
tions II.A and II.B.186 Advances in big data and machine learning have made it
easier for many firms to cull or generate the information necessary for the deliv-
ery of competitive financial services. Automation and machine learning enable
the delivery of financial services in ways more amenable for a new generation of
tech-savvy and mobile consumers. Such innovations-only possible in the age of
the Internet and reliable online data and payments processing-showcase the
potential of fintech to erode the preeminence of traditional financial intermedia-
ries. Robo advisors are taking business from traditional advisors and broker deal-
ers; Person-to-Person (P2P) lending platforms from banking institutions;
crowdfunding and ICOs from venture capital and investment banks; and so on. 18 7
At the same time, rather than fully disintermediating the entire financial proc-
esses, many fintech firms are targeting discrete parts of a financial supply chain.
In other words, instead of actually lending money-and going through the work
of underwriting and documenting loans-a fintech firm may produce a mobile
app that connects to a customer's phone and downloads its data to the lender's
computer systems. Another company, instead of financing a line of credit like a
bank, may provide a simple digital wallet that allows customers to load money to
it for purchases at one or many stores. 88
The rising cast of upstart firms and services need not always compete directly
with incumbents. Instead, new firms may offer services and products that comple-
ment those offered by incumbents to create innovative supply chains for financial
products. In scenarios such as these, entrant firms may wish to take advantage of
185. See, e.g., ASHCRAF & SCHUERMANN, supra note 83, at 11-14 (noting that the chain of
securitizations does include nonbank mortgage lenders that make loans and sell these into institutions in
the more regulated financial sector); Eichengreen & Mitchener, supra note 54, at 9-11 (discussing
speculation in the 1920s).
186. For example, intermediation traditionally played a significant role in finance. See John G.
Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, Financial Institutions and Interrelationships: Financial Intermediaries and
the Saving-Investment Process, 11 J. FIN. 257, 258-59 (1956); John G. Gurley & E.S. Shaw, Financial
Aspects of Economic Development, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 515, 520-21 (1955); James Tobin, Commercial
Banks as Creators of "Money" 3-4 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 159, 1963).
This view, however, is somewhat simplistic. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The
Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2017) ("The intermediated- scarce-private-capital
orthodoxy is a myth ... markets do intermediate, but ... that is not what they are mainly about.");
Zoltan Jakab & Michael Kumhof, Banks are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds-and Why This
Matters (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 529, 2015), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/
files/working-paper/2015/banks-are-not-intermediaries -of-loanable-funds -and-why-this -matters.pdf.
187. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 977, 1001, 1016 (2015); Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 452-57 (2011); Lane, supra note 146; Ben McLannahan, Lending Club Says
Loans on the Rise as it Rebounds from Governance Scandal, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.
com/content/29f2462f-bd57-319c-97a4-9c28e7e7c005 [https://perma.cc/BK4U-PPK5].
188. Cf. Magnuson, supra note 20, at 1199-1204 (discussing the systemic risks of disintermediation).
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the customer networks, access to capital, and expertise offered by incumbents
with a long pedigree. For instance, fintech firms might team up with traditional or
incumbent firms to facilitate new kinds of services for customers in their sec-
tors.18 9 For example, Ripple's XRP, a virtual currency, enables the transfer of
value between banks and financial firms where the traditional system may be too
slow, expensive, or unreliable.1 90 Similarly, loans that are funded through P2P
platforms or assumed on the books of a platform provider can be sold to main-
stream banks or securitized. Such a sale creates space on the books of a P2P
lender for further lending and provides cash to spur more credit. P2P lenders can
thus rely on banks to share some of the risks and benefits of their core business.191
Incumbents may also try to adapt by offering a competing product or by
directly funding and buying fintech firms. The robo advising industry, for
instance, includes new entrants as well as established firms such as Fidelity,
E-Trade, or T.D. Ameritrade that also offer automated advisory services. 1
92
Banks have developed their own mobile payments and digital wallet products to
match those offered by up-and-coming fintech entrepreneurs.1 93 Additionally,
prominent financial firms serve as incubators for fintech talent, putting new com-
panies through their paces and offering pathways to partnership for those that
come up with successful products and proofs of concept.194
Collectively, these moves are transforming the ecosystem of financial services.
Whereas earlier eras of finance saw incumbent firms comfortably provide "one-
stop shops" to manage most aspects of a transaction, fintech is enabling an un-
precedented degree of fragmentation in financial services as new firms compete
with, collaborate with, and, in some instances, replace established incumbents.
All along the value chain, financial services face a more heterogeneous and con-
tested environment as tech experts target entire or discrete processes within a
transaction.195
189. See, e.g., Apple Pay, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apple-pay/ [https://perma.cc/5ZY9-82MG]
(last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (an example of digital payment technology that harnesses existing credit card
and banking networks).
190. See XRP: The Digital Asset for Payments, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/xrp/ [https://perma.cc/
8Y55-4KK5] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (offering banks and payment providers an option to "source
liquidity for cross-border payments," with payments settling in four seconds compared to traditional
systems that may take three to five days).
191. See Peter Rudegeair & Justin Baer, Goldman, Jefferies Put LendingClub Deals on Hold; Banks'
Review of Events Leading to Ouster of CEO Renaud Laplanche Could Jeopardize Securitization Deals,
WALL. ST. J. (May 10, 2016, 10:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-jefferies-pause-buying-
lendingclub-loans- 1462903699 [https://perma.cc/HUW9 -TXTK].
192. See, e.g., Arielle O'Shea, Best Robo-Advisors: 2017 Top Picks, HAYDEN HARPER (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.haydenharper.com/best-robo-advisors-2017 -top-picks/ [https://perma.cc/297V-U8SE].
193. See, e.g., Natt Garun, Zelle, a Payment Network Backed by Major US Banks, Is Launching a
Standalone App, VERGE (Sept. 8, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/8/16270238/zelle-
app-payment- service-us-banks -venmo-competitor [https://perma.cc/3VR4-ERTS].
194. See, e.g., Supercharger FinTech Accelerator 2.0 Reaches Final Milestone, STANDARD CHARTERED
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.sc.com/en/media/press-release/supercharger-fintech-accelerator-2-0-reaches-
final-milestone/ [https://perma.cc/YX3L-739A].
195. See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 19, at 17.
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Although these changes can present welcome enhancement to the delivery of
financial services, they also raise a number of important technological challenges.
No challenge is perhaps more critical than that of interoperability. Not only must
data be culled, but it must also be formatted in ways that other operators can read
and use. For example, an app to facilitate P2P lending will need to integrate into a
lender's data storage and analysis system as well as connect with firms that may
be involved in collecting and processing borrower data (for example, credit
bureaus such as Equifax or Transunion). Even virtual currencies will have to op-
erate on interoperable platforms to achieve the highest levels of utility. Without
credible interoperability, longer and more fragmented supply chains can com-
prise weak links. The failure of one or the other of these links can cause disrup-
tion to the multiple actors involved in delivering fintech services and products.
196
In turn, these changes pose difficulties for regulators. To begin with, disinter-
mediation introduces structural changes to existing mechanisms that underlie the
delivery of important financial services such as lending or payments. These
changes can offer benefits, such as when platforms cheaply link borrowers with
lenders or more user-friendly payment systems. But they also present risks.
Smaller firms may lack experience as well as resources in financial markets.
Interoperability can demand extensive technological know-how and failure is to
be expected. When firms and technologies are new, understanding the consequen-
ces and costs of such failure creates resource demands on regulators to acquire
the information needed to explain future risks and to support the financial system
in case of fallout.
D. HOW FINTECH EXACERBATES THE TRILEMMA
Big data, artificial intelligence, and disintermediation are more than just the
signifiers of modern day fintech. They also exacerbate the historical trade-offs
presented by the trilemma. In this section we show that the defining features of
fintech create an even more complex trilemma than historically present in finan-
cial regulation. At its most fundamental level, fintech creates informational gaps
and uncertainties that increase the difficulty of evaluating the impact of emerging
technologies on market integrity and investor protection. These challenges are
more pronounced because of the extensive use in fintech of sophisticated algo-
rithms and algorithmic trading. With pervasive informational uncertainties,
achieving clear rules becomes problematic, particularly as the actors populating
the financial markets grow more varied from those that have traditionally under-
girded markets.
The three key features of fintech combine to create novel risks to market integ-
rity: the potential for damage is uniquely difficult to measure. To start, the design
196. See Christine Jozet, ISO TC68/AG2 Standards Advisory Group, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTLH.,
https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/other-topics/approach-to-financial -technology- fintech- ?p-
p-auth=008sTOoH&pp id= 169&p p lifecycle=O&p p state--maximized&p_p-col id=column-2&p p_
colpos=l&p p col-count=2& 169 struts action=%2Fdynamic data list display%2Fviewrecord&_
169_recordld=2010553 [https://perma.cc/SPF8-F3G8] (last visited Dec. 10, 2018).
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of fintech products and services-although anchored by vast troves of big and
brand new types of data-introduces steep informational uncertainties for
regulators.
For financial firms data drives investment, trading, hedging, and lending deci-
sions.1 97 Its promise to fuel creative innovations in product design (for example,
in online lending) is showcased by fintech harnessing data from an expanding
array of sources, sometimes of recent vintage. News and opinion websites, cell-
phone data, social media, shopping preferences, and personal habits constitute
fodder for fintech firms often looking to apply proprietary mining methodologies
to extract insights. 198 Data, in short, is more ubiquitous, novel, and plentiful than
ever before.1 99
But big data also raises serious questions. Few such questions are more
important-or complex-than whether newly available data is trustworthy.
"Fake news" spread through doctored Facebook and Twitter profiles can
impact the allocation of capital. 200 And these social media outlets are difficult
to supervise.2 Systems available to test their usefulness for finance are in their
infancy and can exhibit poor performance.2 2 Data scraped from the Internet
originating from a multiplicity of decentralized sources (such as social media
websites)-may be inaccurate, outdated or manipulated.2 3
Al and machine learning exacerbate these risks. Poor inputs result in poor out-
puts. And when it does, bad data acted upon by automated algorithms can intro-
duce a new kind of model risk into financial markets-the risk that programming
197. The value of data reaches beyond fintech. See, e.g., The World's Most Valuable Resource is No
Longer Oil, but Data, (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-
valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/8V5T-XSXK].
198. See, e.g., Allen Taylor, Peer-to-Peer Loans: Can Economically Intuitive Factors Improve
Ability of Proprietary Algorithms to Predict Defaults?, LENDING TiiMs (July 17, 2017), https://lending-
times.com/2017/07/17/peer-to-peer-loans -can-economically-intuitive- factors -improve-ability-of-proprietary-
algorithms-to-predict-defaults/ [https://perma.cc/5JHS-UCGG].
199. See HE ET AL., supra note 19, at 7, 10.
200. See supra notes 150, 179 and accompanying text.
201. See Chengcheng Shao et al., The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots, 9 NATURE
COMM. 1 (2018); see, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2011,
1:30 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4 [https://perma.cc/M452-
SXZL]; Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/3T3E-
P3LL] (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
202. See DELOITTE CTR. FOR FN. SERVS., supra note 132, at 5; see, e.g., Mannix & Smolinski, supra
note 136. Testing can involve subjecting technologies to simulated scenarios to see how they might
perform, for example, during "normal" times as well as during crises. Tests may also evaluate how
effectively a technology has weathered historical challenges. Tests might check to see the successful
interoperability of the technology with those of different firms and financial services. Firms might wish
to see the kinds of speeds and data-processing capacities that their technologies can achieve. Fintech
testing may face difficulty owing to the newness of the technologies and their limited operating history.
If a brand new technology has only been in existence for a couple of years, there may be insufficient
history to know how effective a technology is under different market conditions as well as anticipate its
performance under simulated conditions. See Lane, supra note 146.
203. See Merle, supra note 178.
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does not accurately represent the world as it is.2 ° Algorithms operate in accord-
ance with programming that is based on a set of assumptions, parameters, statisti-
cal models, and decisionmaking processes-any of which may be wrong,
inaccurate, or imprecise.
Although model risk has always existed in markets to varying degrees, fin-
tech's challenges become all the greater in the context of complex artificial intel-
ligence. As discussed above, machine-learning algorithms are purposefully
designed to reprogram themselves over time to reflect incoming data and external
validation-with varying degrees of hands-on human supervision.2 5 This endog-
enous, computerized learning sets up the prospect that algorithms use internal
processing and validation mechanisms whose reasoning and outputs are unpre-
dictable ex ante and difficult to correct in real time, representing a kind of "black
box" for regulators.20 6 Further, algorithms are capable of deploying speeds and
data that surpass the cognitive capacities of human beings. A more fragmented
fintech supply chain means that programming must be interoperable across a
greater number of actors, increasing the points of vulnerability at which some-
thing can go awry.
Critically, although big data can help algorithms process volumes of informa-
tion and ensure that programming is more responsive, it also requires that this
programming be powerful enough to capture, interpret, and assign a value to this
content. This task can be challenging, even for cutting-edge automated systems.
For example, algorithms may only be able to produce interpretations that rest on
the assumption that human beings function rationally or within certain defined
parameters of behavior. Actions that reflect biases or idiosyncratic motivations
can often be difficult for algorithms to process. 2 7 In lending, for example, schol-
ars have highlighted the role of human biases and behavioral quirks in shaping
borrowing and repayment behavior.2 8 Although algorithms may be growing
more sophisticated and perhaps capable of accounting for certain heuristics, those
204. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1647-55 (2015).
205. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
206. See PASQUALE, supra note 135, at 59-65 (discussing secretive search algorithms used by well-
recognized search engine Google as well as other portals such as Apple and Amazon that influence
"what we do, think and buy"); Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of Al, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [https://
perma.cc/D5B7-UBFF]. But see Vijay Pande, Artificial Intelligence's "Black Box" Is Nothing to Fear,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinion/artificial-intelligence-black-
box.html [https://nyti.ms/2GieLsu].
207. See Conrad De Aenlle, A.I. Has Arrived in Investing. Humans Are Still Dominating., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/business/ai-investing-humans -dominating.
html [https://nyti.ms/2Ftpsbf].
208. See Benjamin J. Keys & Jialan Wang, Minimum Payment and Debt Paydown in Consumer
Credit Cards 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22742, 2016), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w22742.pdf. There is a considerable and growing literature on behavioral aspects of lending.
In the case of retirement and investment choices, see, for example, Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F.
Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 QJ. ECON.
1149 (2001).
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whose programming cannot account for these more complex, softer variables are
likely to deliver an imprecise or erroneous result.
Concerns about the robustness of algorithmic programming raises the distinct
but related question regarding how well algorithms might perform under unusual,
unpredictable, or stressful market conditions. What happens when real-world
conditions fall outside of an algorithm's programming and when learning algo-
rithms struggle to process softer data to derive predictions? In such cases, algo-
rithmic programming can lack the necessary flexibility to react effectively to a
shifting market environment and thus deliver inferior results as compared to
human intermediaries.20 9 For example, research has highlighted that human
beings may be able to cope much more effectively in difficult, complicated cir-
cumstances that require them to think on their feet and take unusual, creative
steps.210 Anecdotally, examples like that of Betterment noted in the Introduction,
illustrate the enormous difficulty that programmers face in designing algorithms
that can capture and respond to any number of unexpected, real-world scenarios.
All the while, the participation of small, sometimes inexperienced firms raises
the danger that they may not possess the institutional resilience to withstand the
fallout caused by their error or the collapse or similar failures of another firm
within a more fragmented financial supply chain. The computational complexity
of algorithmic programming and big data means that firms need deep pockets to
invest in developing and overseeing the quality of data processing and algorith-
mic design. Yet small firms or those new to Wall Street are likely to lack the
resources to do so. Importantly, interconnections between firms, rather than
within departments of one single firm, may be more susceptible to the risk that
one or more of these links fails and causes disruptions to the supply chain as a
whole. To the extent that such vulnerabilities exist, firms must be able to collabo-
rate to identify risks and work out how to reduce bad outcomes. But where such
small firms operate as part of longer or more fragmented supply chains, any sin-
gle firm within the supply chain will likely lack the incentive to police its
functioning.
In response to such probable and potentially serious risks, conventional wis-
dom would suggest that regulators will turn to tried-and-tested mechanisms
designed to impose checks and controls on firms. As discussed in Part I, in
response to possible dangers, regulators have imposed a range of measures to off-
set the risk and to protect market integrity: mandatory disclosure rules requiring
information about a firm's future activities; activity bans; entry restrictions on
209. See Vikas Raman et al., Man vs. Machine: Liquidity Provision and Market Fragility 4 (2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.nseindia.com/research/content/1314_BS8.pdf; see also Bruno
Biais et al., Equilibrium Pricing and Trading Volume Under Preference Uncertainty, 81 REV. ECON.
STUD. 1401, 1402-03 (2014) (noting that algorithms struggle to overcome "preference uncertainty"
when outside circumstances require nuance, flexibility, and the capacity to reevaluate trading strategies).
210. See Raman et al., supra note 209, at 4.
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those seeking to offer financial services; conduct of business rules; or the require-
ment for capital buffers to ensure that firms suffering losses can afford them.211
Still, fintech's mix of new and old firms within a more fragmented and disinter-
mediated financial supply chain complicates the task of memorializing an effec-
tive set of rules. More resources must be allocated to understanding a constantly
evolving ecosystem and deploying rules expeditiously enough to core regulatory
objectives. The fragmentation caused by disintermediation also makes the task of
allocating regulatory burdens fairly within the financial sector more challenging.
Smaller firms often pose greater risks, given their limited size and balance sheet.
But compliance costs are relatively fixed and do not always scale proportionately.
Small firms with good ideas might be driven out of the market where complex
obligations and rules are imposed, undermining competition-and ultimately
innovation-in the process. And overall, market integrity itself can be compro-
mised where firms fail to comply due to the relative opaqueness of the governing
regulatory system.
III. THE SPECTRUM OF REGULATORY RESPONSES
Regulators in the United States and around the world have adopted a diverse
spectrum of approaches toward fintech, from relatively informal to relatively
more formal measures. This Part outlines these regulatory strategies, details how
they deal with the risks of fintech, and examines their effectiveness through the
lens of the trilemma. We conclude with a discussion of a kind of experimental fi-
nancial regulation in the form of "sandboxes."
At first glance, regulators appear to have adopted distinct policy preferences in
overseeing fintech, as evidenced by their choice of specific tools and supervisory
mechanisms. Whereas some regulators seem to have enthusiastically embraced
regulatory experimentation by offering sandboxes to innovators, others have
sought to bring new technologies within the purview of existing regulation. In
this Part, however, we suggest that the various strategies that regulators have put
forward should not be conceptualized as distinct binary choices between high and
low levels of regulation. Rather, we argue that policymakers are utilizing a range
of approaches that enable varying forms of control, experimentation, and guid-
ance. Moreover, how regulators choose to label certain regulatory approaches
(for example, "sandboxes," "charters," or "licenses") itself represents a form of
strategic signaling that may not always accurately convey the degree of compli-
ance intensity a regulator intends to impose. For example, offering a "charter"
instead of a "sandbox" might hint that a regulator intends to impose a more exact-
ing regulatory regime.212
211. See supra Section I.A.
212. As we discuss below, a charter represents a method of formally authorizing a firm to conduct
certain regulated activities. See infra Section III.C. Sandboxes reflect a more innovative approach to
regulation, offering firms a space within which to experiment under circumscribed conditions. See infra
Section III.D.
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However, this need not always be the case. As fintech broadens the scope and
application of existing regulatory tools, charters can also be used in a way that
gives innovators room for regulatory experimentation. Conversely, although
sandboxes might point to a willingness to tolerate risky experimentation by fin-
tech firms, the design of the sandbox can impose strictures that force firms to
internalize sizable compliance costs. This availability of multiple regulatory
methods also gives regulators flexibility in tackling innovations at various stages
of development. For example, sandboxes or more informal guidance may be
helpful to assist brand new technologies. A sandbox can enable regulators to col-
lect information about a novel product as a basis for deciding how best to regulate
it in the future. In turn, informal tools such as guidance can offer innovators a
roadmap as they develop new ideas. More formal methods such as charters,
licenses, or legislation may be more suited to regulate more mature technologies
whose risks and benefits are clearer.
In analyzing these varying approaches this Part breaks down the objectives
behind evolving regulatory strategies and highlights where these strategies fall
short in dealing with the new risks posed by fintech. Our discussion surveys a
spectrum of regulatory responses: (i) informal guidance, including discrete
actions, such as through no-action letters; (ii) pilots; (iii) licenses and charters;
and (iv) sandboxes as examples of more experimental regulatory strategies. Our
goal in this Part is to highlight the broad approaches being adopted by regulators
to contend with fintech, rather than providing a granular survey of each kind of
regulatory action being taken across international markets. This Part thus show-
cases the major trends and shortcomings in meeting the specific challenges posed
by the use of big data, by Al, and by the disintermediation characteristic of
today's fintech.
A. INFORMAL GUIDANCE
One avenue of mediating the trilemma is informality. Regulators can offer
their views or expectations of market participants without necessarily undergoing
a full administrative or procedural rulemaking. As such, their guidance does not
necessarily obligate authorities to permanently condone or prohibit any particular
course of action.213 But informal methods can offer a means of facilitating inno-
vation or building market integrity through direct and simple communication
with market participants. By providing guidance or taking ad hoc actions such as
giving speeches or issuing no-action letters, regulators can take steps to shore up
market integrity by signaling areas of possible concern or future regulation.214
Such regulatory action enables fintech firms to better innovate, insofar as they are
able to better recognize what kind of regulatory burden they might face.
This kind of informal action may be undertaken on a case-by-case basis and
thus implicitly acknowledges the evolving nature of innovation. It is also an
213. See No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersnoactionhtm.html [https ://perma.cc/9X48-QHMG].
214. See, e.g., Hinman, supra note 7.
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approach with an established pedigree in the regulatory canon. U.S. securities
regulators, for one, rely extensively on no-action letters.215 With a no-action let-
ter, the SEC can clarify its position to a market participant about whether it con-
siders a proposed line of action to be in breach of securities rules or likely to elicit
an enforcement action. Such letters offer specific market participants (and some-
times the industry at large) guidance on the future permissiveness of the SEC
regarding a specific course of action.2 16 General guidance also provides an idea of
what kinds of behavior the SEC considers to be acceptable.217
Unsurprisingly, regulators are issuing guidance about what kind of compliance
obligations attach to innovations. Robo advising, for instance, represents an area
whose development appears to have preceded the articulation of a coherent body
of law to regulate its practice. The SEC has delivered guidance to explain how
robo advising can comply with the body of law governing investment advising.218
Although merely guidance rather than regulation, it explains the significance of
key protections for investors, such as the requirement that advisors observe a fidu-
ciary standard vis-h-vis those they advise.219 The guidance describes the disclo-
sure practices that firms might comply with when using robo advisors in their
business; these practices include both general disclosures as well as those specific
to robo advice (for example, telling clients that an algorithm is assisting in man-
aging their money).220 In the area of ICOs, SEC leadership has given speeches as
well as signaling statements outlining the prospective risks of ICOs, pointing to
the chances of future regulation in this area.2 2 1
This flexible regulatory approach can generate a number of benefits. For one,
regulators deploy tools that are familiar and easily implemented. Guidance-
from reports to no-action letters-can be delivered swiftly and are responsive to
215. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters:
Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 921-22 (1998).
216. See No Action Letters, supra note 213 (detailing the different forms that such letters take and the
scope of their permissiveness); see also Kimberly Till, The SEC Safe Harbor for Forecasts-A Step in
the Right Direction?, 1980 DUKE L.J. 607 (describing the SEC safe harbor for future-looking forecasts
and discussing the safe harbor mechanism); Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N
(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rle506htm.html [https://perma.cc/47DM-
WW54] (outlining a very popular safe harbor used to raise capital in the private market).
217. See, e.g., Div. INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, GUIDANCE UPDATE (Feb. 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf; Clayton, supra note 1.
218. See, e.g., Div. INV. MGMT., supra note 217; Clayton, supra note 1.
219. See Div. INV. MGMT., supra note 217. Note, however, that FINRA raises concerns about the
capacity of robo advisors to comply with the fiduciary standard. See Melanie L. Fein, FINRA's Report
on Robo-Advisors: Fiduciary Implications (May 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2768295 [https://perma.cc/37NY-DLMQ] (noting the concerns raised
by the FINRA guidance about the likely compliance of robo advisors with the fiduciary standard). Also,
note that the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has issued guidance on the
regulation of robo advising in fintech. See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'S, UPDATE TO THE REPORT ON THE
IOSCO AUTOMATED ADVICE TOOLS SURVEY: FINAL REPORT (2016), https://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD552.pdf (detailing the spectrum of approaches taken by national regulators with
respect to the growth of robo advising in their domestic jurisdictions).
220. See Div. INV. MGMT., supra note 217, at 3-4.
221. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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fast-moving market developments. Compliance costs for firms may decrease as a
result. Firms can use guidance to avoid falling foul of regulatory prohibitions and
becoming subject to penalties and sanctions. All the while, informal guidance can
help signal enforcement priorities and the regulatory intent to give wider berth to
certain proposed activities.
That said, informal guidance does not necessarily increase the informational
capital within agencies. Informal guidance does not ordinarily require notice and
comment or data collection-or, for that matter, any iterative contact or informa-
tion sharing with regulators during the course of the relevant conduct. 222 It thus
provides only a limited channel for bolstering regulatory expertise. Instead, data
is largely generated once permission has been granted, in a post hoc manner.
Decisions may, as a result, introduce undue risk or alternatively prove too restric-
tive. Only when a new process is generated, by new no-action requests or internal
studies may guidelines be revisited. Meanwhile, from the standpoint of market
participants, no-action letters offer relief only to the firm making a request, and
even then only indicate that the SEC staff would not recommend that the SEC
take enforcement action against the requesting firm based on the facts and repre-
sentations described in the individual's or entity's request. No guarantees are
made.
B. PILOTS
One way to address some of the limitations of informal guidance is through
experimentation. In practice, experimentation often takes place in the form of
pilots, through which regulators can design or oversee tests involving new inno-
vations or techniques, observe outcomes, and then tailor rulemaking to its most
efficient and effective form. These tests offer a means to facilitate financial inno-
vation as well as safeguard market integrity. Properly designed, pilots provide
regulators with a way to generate information on the likely effects of particular
products or services. Such data can be useful for policymakers to observe risks,
the chances that risks spread, networks, and the capacity of market firms to bear
the costs of innovations.223 Equipped with closer real-world knowledge, regula-
tors are well placed to craft rules that facilitate desirable innovations in a way that
protects market safety and soundness.
As with informal guidance, pilots can take a number of shapes and approaches.
In China, where pilots are common, authorities have introduced a range of regula-
tory pilot projects tied to liberalizing the country's financial markets and
222. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011) https://www.
federalregister.gov/uploads/201 1/01/the rulemaking-process.pdf ("Guidance documents do not contain
amendments to the CFR and are not subject to the notice and comment process."). In other words,
guidance is unlikely to require regulated entities to provide information to the regulator on their conduct
or future activity. Rather, such guidance constitutes communication from the regulator to the market,
rather than tasking the market participants to provide detailed data on their activities to the regulator.
223. See Brett Redfearn, Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., Remarks at the Equity Market Structure
Symposium Sponsored by the University of Chicago and the STA Foundation (Apr. 10, 2018), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-redfeam-2018 -04-10 [https://perma.cc/R4DG-C9KT].
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improving financial access. For example, the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission (CIRC), the country's insurance regulator, introduced a two-year
pilot project designed to give insurance companies the regulatory room to offer
services and products across city and state lines. Starting on February 1, 2017, the
CIRC began allowing insurance companies based in Beijing, Tianjin, or Hebei to
conduct business across these regions. 224 The avowed objective of the pilot is to
encourage insurance companies to set up shop in Tianjin or Hebei, where costs
are lower relative to Beijing, and to sell their services in Beijing and elsewhere
within the permitted zone.225 Companies participating in the pilot must meet eli-
gibility conditions, but otherwise, the pilot offers an illustration of regulators
seeking to test run regulatory innovations within a controlled setting.226 In addi-
tion to insurance, Chinese regulators are also running pilots in the areas of bank-
* 22 228 229ing, 7wealth fund management,  and tax.
Pilot programs in the United States, by contrast, are rarer and structured to
resemble natural experiments-often supported by strict rules and conditions
aimed at ensuring the collection and analysis of data. For example, in October
2016, the SEC began its two-year pilot program to experiment with "tick sizes,"
or the price increments in which the buying and selling price of stocks is quoted
on national exchanges. 230 The SEC's study examines tick sizes for "small-cap"
stocks-those with a market capitalization of three billion dollars or less.231
Instead of applying new tick sizes to small-caps across the board, the pilot format
targets an expressly empirical approach to regulation. A total of 1,400 small-cap
stocks are divided into control and test groups.232 The control group uses the cur-
rent tick size of one cent per share (for example, $1.01) while the test groups use
five-cent minimum increments (for example, $1.05), which are also divided in
224. See China: Pilot Programme for Insurance Company and Agency Cross-Regional Business,
LLOYD'S (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.lloyds.com/the-market/communications/regulatory-communications-
homepage/regulatory-conmmunications/regulatory-news-articles/2017/03/china-pilot-programme-for-insurance-
company-and-agency-crossregional-business [https://peina.cc/VF4W-VGJV].
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., China to Launch Private Bank Pilot Program, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2014, 9:35 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us -china-economy-banks -idUSBREA2A02V20140311 [https://perma.
cc/7EDZ-4VTY].
228. Gabriel Wildau & Shengnan Zhang, China Pilot Scheme Aims to Shatter Assumption;
Investments are Not Guaranteed, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
banks -debt-idUSBRE99915D20131010 [https://perma.cc/KFM3-ACL6]
229. See, e.g., Xingxing Zhang, China Launches VAT Pilot Program in Special Customs Supervision
Zone, IT CONVERGENCE (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.itconvergenceinsights.com/china-launches -vat-
pilot-program-in- special-customs -supervision-zones [https://perma.cc/R2RZ-TFRE].
230. See Investor Alert: Tick Size Pilot Program-What Investors Need to Know, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ia ticksize.html [https://
perma.cc/GY72-GV4U].
231. Id. In addition to market capitalization, for example, the study also requires the selected
companies to be subject to trading volume limitations (for example, seeing fewer than average daily
trading volume of one million shares or less and a volume-weighted average price of at least $2.00 for
every trading day). Id.
232. Id.
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accordance with certain other controlled conditions. 233 Through this study, the
SEC should gamer concrete insights into whether changes to tick sizes for small-
cap stocks are likely to impact how efficiently these stocks trade. Ultimately, by
testing out which trading conditions are most beneficial, regulatory policy and
decisionmaking can be better informed.234
Similarly, the CFPB has encouraged fintech innovators to pitch proposals for
pilot programs or novel disclosure trials to meet its goals of enhanced consumer
protection. Launched in 2012, the Project Catalyst program encourages entrepre-
neurs to offer ideas for pilot projects to the Bureau's staff. When the staff finds
"strong, testable potential for substantive benefit to everyday people," experimen-
tal programs may be made available for testing. 235 For example, H&R Block, the
tax advisory and preparation firm, introduced a program designed to study the
effectiveness of certain tax planning and saving practices. 236 The program
included practices such as providing consumers with better informational materi-
als to encourage them to save a portion of their tax refund, as well as greater dis-
closure of savings products when they make their tax preparation appointment.237
Project Catalyst has featured a range of pilots covering experimental initiatives to
test innovations in credit provision, disclosure, and tax planning. 238
Pilot programs operate further along the regulatory frontier than informal guid-
ance mechanisms. They allow for more experimentation and innovation (as well
as risk taking) than ad hoc, case-by-case no-action letters. They also create more
legal certainty than informal guidance regimes during the period in which they
are in effect, even as the rules applied to conduct may be stricter to ensure that an
experiment may be conducted and data gathered for analysis. Notably, however,
the pilot does not offer any certainty about whether the conduct under observation
will eventually be permitted or how broadly this activity might be rolled out in
the market. In the case of China, for instance, where pilots appear to be a heavily
used regulatory tool, there may be greater expectation that results lead to perma-
nent activities that are more broadly extended to other parts of the country. By
233. Id.
234. The SEC's study is being undertaken under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), to see how
decimalization of tick sizes might affect the ease by which investors and issuers in small-cap stocks
trade by looking at the impact on liquidity and volatility of trading conditions. See Investor Alert, supra
note 230. For discussion on the purposes of the study as well as more detail on its experimental methods,
see id.
235. See Let's Collaborate: Pitch a Pilot, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/project-catalyst/pitch-pilot/ [https://perma.cc/9LMH-LN6P].
236. See PROJECT CATALYST REPORT: PROMOTING CONSUMER-FRIENDLY INNOVATION, U.S.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 19 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
documents/102016_cfpbProjectCatalystReport.pdf.
237. See id. But see Brian V. Breheny et al., SEC's Proposed Transaction Free Pilot Program
Continues to Provoke Discussion, SKADDEN (July 16, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2018/07/secs-proposed-transaction- fee-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/ZH2D-TB2K].
238. See id. at 17-20; see also Recent Updates, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/activity-log/?topics=project-catalyst [https://perma.cc/PSG2-TSNA] (last visited
Oct. 30, 2018).
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contrast, in the United States, where pilots are rarer and may have less predictive
power, pilots can at least offer an empirical basis on which to formulate discrete
rules, even if such rules are not in themselves the subject of the experiment. Just
like no-action letters, pilots can be ended after the test period, allowing for policy
reversals.
C. LICENSES
In a less direct form of experimentation-but a more permanent form of lim-
ited permission granting-regulators can grant discrete licenses allowing relevant
firms to engage in specified activities, though under highly controlled and
restrained circumstances. Licenses and charters can be especially useful to regu-
lators. Through their use, regulators can control who enters the market and care-
fully scrutinize entry to permit only those entities that can safely participate.
Through this process, they can acquire information about firms, their products
and services, and what kinds of risks they pose. Such information offers a way to
enhance the effectiveness of rulemaking to govern innovations.
Licenses of this kind can be "rules based," offering bright lines as to how they
are granted, or they can be more discretionary. In other words, a rules-based
license sets out exact conditions under which an activity may occur. By contrast,
a more discretionary approach authorizes firms to conduct a range of activities of
their choosing under an umbrella permission. An example of a more rules-based
approach is the U.S. approach to equity crowdfunding. Under the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act, the SEC issued rules permitting startups to issue
equity securities to ordinary people through the Internet so long as they meet min-
imal specified disclosure requirements. As a means of controlling investor risk,
the amount of money investors are permitted to invest is capped and an issuer is
limited to raising a maximum of one million dollars.239
There are clear advantages to using bright-line legislation to license innova-
tions in fintech. With rules laid out in advance offering permanent regulatory
relief, there is minimal legal uncertainty. Furthermore, the rules are clear and sim-
ple, allowing for easy compliance. This clarity can encourage firms and investors
239. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012);
Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200). Regulation
Crowdfunding took effect in May 2016 to allow small companies to raise around one million dollars in a
year through designated portals that display their offering documents as well as offer investors a means
to certify wealth and eligibility to participate in the offering.
On disintermediation, see generally C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (showcasing the history of crowdfunding and a proposal for
legislation); Brummer, supra note 187, at 1020-35 (discussing the disintermediation of public
companies); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457 (2013). In
addition to Regulation Crowdfunding, the SEC has also passed Regulation A+ (with an offering amount
of up to fifty million dollars) to facilitate capital raising. See Amendments for Small and Additional
Issues Exemption Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (Apr. 20, 2015); David
Gilinsky et al., Regulation of Crowdfunding in the UK, US and Israel: A Comparative Review, 10 J.
INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 600A (2016) (discussing the requirements of Regulation A+).
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to come forward. It can also help ensure that regulators are engaged in supervi-
sion and are enforcing the terms and conditions of their participation.
But there are also disadvantages. As with any bright-line approach, the rules
can be over- and under-inclusive. Some individuals may be sophisticated enough
to make larger investments despite their net worth but restricted in their abilities
to take on this risk. Moreover, caps placed on the total amount of money a firm
may raise can stifle fundraising altogether or create a two-speed marketplace. As
Professor Usha Rodrigues writes, real money-making companies are unlikely to
reach out to the common man for an investment, particularly one capped at one
million dollars.240 This reality then can leave only lemons for small-time invest-
ors to pick through as top-flight ventures are marketed privately to rich, professio-
nal investors. 241 From this standpoint, the license-though limited-does not
necessarily solve or mitigate the challenges inherent to the trilemma.
Not surprisingly, some regulators have preferred to maintain discretion in their
attempts to introduce greater (and safer) innovation. For example, in an effort to
soften the hard strictures of banking regulation for fintech, the OCC has intro-
duced "fintech charters" that permit firms to acquire the designation of a special
purpose national banking organization.242 As initially proposed, by complying
with specific eligibility criteria modified from those the OCC applies to
240. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3427-37
(2013).
241. See id. On the changing notion of "publicness" in securities markets in response to deregulation
and technological changes, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); see also Brummer,
supra note 187.
242. See U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/special-purpose -national -bank- charters -for-fintech.pdf [hereinafter OCC,
EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE]; see also Perianne Boring, You Down with 0CC?-FinTech Firms See
Promise in Special Bank Charter, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2017, 8:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
perianneboring/2017/01/27/you -down- with-occ- fintech-firms- see-promise -in- special -bank -charter/
#4322d7d032el [https://perma.cc/4HZT-DHB6]. The OCC released additional policy guidance and
began accepting national bank charter applications in 2018. See U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES' ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY
FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (2018), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/
other-publications -reports/pub-other-occ -policy- statement-flntech.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from
Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/5RQ8-5MXY] [hereinafter Press Release, OCC]; see also
U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL
SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (2018),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-Im-considering-charter-
applications- flntech.pdf.
The OCC established an Office of Innovation designed to forward flntech and other initiatives. In addition,
some have criticized the proposal as potentially falling short on the goal of putting fintech to use in
broadening financial inclusion. See, e.g., MELANIE BRODY & JEFFREY TAFT, MAYER BROWN, SPECIAL-
PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2017), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/
Event/f6832c7e-5ceO-4c95-9915-450f79988543/Presentation/EventAttachment/7d9ad646-f7b3-49b8-
ace6-bf89fb000142/170118 -NYC -SEMINAR -CFS -Breakfast-Briefing- Slides.pdf
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traditional banks, fintech firms can win a charter to perform certain banking-
related activities. 243 Holding an OCC charter means fintech firms can avoid the
costs and complexities of complying with various state laws, and instead follow
the rules of the OCC's federal regime.244
The program has been celebrated by some industry experts but has also
attracted criticism, even among bankers and lobbyists. Among the chief com-
plaints is that the OCC, although announcing standards for charters, explicitly
refrains from articulating how, in practice, it "will evaluate, supervise, and exam-
ine" applicants, undermining the clarity and potential simplicity of the pro-
gram.245 Under the proposal, then, participants face uncertainty as to whether
their efforts to obtain a charter will be welcomed by regulators or likely to attain
success. 246 Second, and closely related, the agency's case-by-case approach does
not, as of yet, clearly provide ex ante indications as to how much latitude it will
give fintech firms to operate in more traditional banking sectors. Instead, the
agency instructs firms that they will need to demonstrate how their policies, pro-
cedures, and practices will protect individuals and small business customers-
without firms knowing exactly how to meet these expectations or what specific
advantages the OCC will grant via the charter.247 Collectively, these problems
have made the program, in the eyes of some firms, too risky to commit their
243. See U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING
MANUAL DRAFT SUPPLEMENT: EVALUATING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-
Im-fintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf; see also OCC, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE, supra note
242, at 3-15.
244. This proposal has been controversial. Notably, state banking authorities sued the OCC in
relation to its proposed issue of a national fintech banking charter, arguing that the OCC overstepped its
authority and encroached upon the jurisdictions of state banking regulators. See Lalita Clozel, State
Regulators Sue OCC Over FinTech Charter, AM. BANKER (Apr. 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.
americanbanker.com/news/state-regulators- sue-occ-over- fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/5HWQ-
NRPB]. This suit was dropped because no charter has yet been granted to fintech firms. In late fall, the
states renewed their suit. See Lalita Clozel, 'Fintech Charter' Has No Early Takers as Lawsuit Looms,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2018 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-charter-has-no-early-
takers-as-lawsuit-looms-1536764426 [https://perma.cc/AWP4-6KWV]; Neil Haggerty, With OCC
Wavering on Fintech Charter, Judge Drops States' Lawsuit, AM. BANKER (May 1, 2018, 1:47 PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/with-occ-wavering-on-fintech-charter-judge-drops-states-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/PJM5 -YPQW].
245. Letter from The Clearing House, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., and Sec Indus. & Fin. Mkts.
Ass'n., to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on Exploring Special Purpose National Bank
Charters for Fintech Companies (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
JointTradesOCCFinTechCharterComment Letter vF.pdf; see also KEVIN PETRASIC ET AL.,
WHITE & CASE, FINTECH COMPANIES AND BANK CHARTERS: OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 2018,
at 5 (2018), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/ download/publications/fintech-
companies-and-bank-charters-options-and-considerations-for-2018.pdf ("[T]he OCC has indicated that
fintech national banks will have obligations under or similar to the Community Reinvestment Act, such
as financial inclusiveness requirements, but has not specified how such requirements would be imposed
or how evaluations would be conducted for fintech banks without physical locations").
246. See Clozel, supra note 244.
247. See Press Release, OCC, supra note 242 (noting criteria, including that "[e]very application will
be evaluated on its unique facts and circumstances").
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resources. Indeed, because of the controversies surrounding the program, the
OCC has faced considerable pressure to rescind it or revise its parameters.248
D. REGULATORY "SANDBOXES"
Informal guidance, pilot studies, licenses, and charters grapple with financial
innovation in various ways. These approaches seek to lower risk, improve the
utility of innovations, and introduce system-wide clarity. Each of these tactics
comes with its own set of trade-offs, as the trilemma predicts. Novel transactions
may receive only tentative case-by-case (and informal) approval. Pilots may be
attractive when information cost is low and the risks tied to commitment-making
are high. Licenses, meanwhile, may seem appropriate when their constraints ei-
ther appear easy to administer or are subject to ongoing discretionary control.
However, these are all ad hoc policy responses. Because these strategies oper-
ate incrementally, some regulators are combining them into more forward-
looking forms of regulatory engagement. Commonly referred to as regulatory
"sandboxes," these programs represent an attempt by authorities to build supervi-
sory capacity through engagement and state-sponsored innovation and experi-
mentation. In some instances, sandboxes may be offered as part of a larger
regulatory "Innovation Hub," designed to offer firms assistance with navigating
compliance burdens and testing their ideas against specific real-world
problems.249
The sandbox arguably provides a genuinely new addition to the regulatory ar-
senal, different from past practices on which policymakers have relied to accom-
modate financial innovation.
The sandbox rests on two basic ideas: (i) innovators are provided an environ-
ment within which to experiment and try out their innovations under real-world
conditions; and (ii) to do so, regulators offer developers a relaxed regulatory envi-
ronment, albeit one subject to specific supervisory parameters and subject to con-
tinuing supervision.250 Sandboxes expressly seek to encourage innovation. They
offer regulators a means to acquire insight into the development process for inno-
vations, give input into their design, and better understand how emerging prod-
ucts and services might operate in the real world. Particularly for early-stage
innovations, sandboxes can be helpful in reducing the pervasive information
248. See Haggerty, supra note 244.
249. See, e.g., Innovate and Innovation Hub, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub [https://perma.cc/Z9WL-9MTT]; RegTech, U.K. FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH. (OCT. 4, 2018), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub/regtech [https://
perma.cc/HW2U-DF7E]; see also FCA Innovate, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/
firms/fca-innovate [https://perma.cc/M2VW-F4YH] (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (demonstrating that the
sandbox is part of a larger innovation lab). On sandboxes and their workability in the U.S. regulatory
structure, see generally Hilary J. Allen, A US Regulatory Sandbox? (Feb. 8, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3056993 [https://perma.cc/M334-4SF8].
250. See Innovate and Innovation Hub, supra note 249; see also AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N,
LICENSING EXEMPTION FOR FINTECH TESTING, http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-
hub/licensing-and-regulation/licensing-exemption- for- fintech-testing/ [https://perma.cc/GU9M-ULHG]
(last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
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uncertainties attaching to the growth of algorithms and Al, as well as to the via-
bility of new data.
Although sandboxes come in different guises, with agencies and jurisdictions
varying in what terms they offer, the guiding idea is simple enough: rather than
be subject to restrictive or complex rules that elevate regulatory risk and poten-
tially stifle innovation, the sandbox offers a means of testing new ideas in a sim-
plified, interactive regulatory environment. And rather than deal with the usual
silos operating in financial regulation-separating securities regulation from
banking, for example-developers can build cross-sectoral inventions within the
controlling parameters of the regulatory sandbox. A firm developing a digital
wallet for customer payments, for instance, might wish to sell this technology to
banks, credit card companies, investment funds, or insurance companies.
Regulatory sandboxes are increasingly popular and appear across jurisdictions.
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), a sandbox pio-
neer, has created an "Innovation Hub" whose purpose lies in testing financial
products in a live environment. Rather than obtaining formal authorization, fin-
tech firms can apply to be included in small cohorts that are selected to join a fi-
nancial services incubator for developing and testing these new products.21 The
FCA offers these firms a restricted license. 2 Interestingly, firms that are already
regulated by the FCA can also apply to use the sandbox. 253 To help them test their
ideas, the FCA is prepared to offer no-action letters with respect to enforcement,
rule modifications, or license waivers as a means to encourage experimenta-
tion. 254 The FCA is explicit in being open to softening or waiving the application
of rules when they are likely to prove overly burdensome for would-be
inventors.255
Other jurisdictions are competing to offer similar innovation hubs, albeit with
some differences. As part of its sandbox, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian services market regulator, offers
a broad, twelve-month licensing waiver to fintech companies to test out financial
services and credit-based innovations in a real-world setting. 256 This waiver
means that firms are not required to obtain full authorization to conduct a regu-
lated activity and can instead test out new innovations within the sandbox's stra-
tegically relaxed compliance environment. There are conditions attached.
251. See U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOXES LESSONS LEARNED REPORT (2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-les sons-learned-report.pdf;
Regulatory Sandbox, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (OCT. 22, 2018), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/
innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory- sandbox [https://perma.cc/7VZR-WPEB].
252. See U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 251, at 9 ("Restrictions are placed on each firm's
authorisation to ensure that they are only able to test up to the volumes prescribed in their testing
plans.").
253. See Applying to the Regulatory Sandbox, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory- sandbox/prepare-application [https://perma.cc/J95K-PYMZ].
254. See Sandbox Tools, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/
regulatory- sandbox/sandbox-tools [https:/perma.cc/K9TK-TY9F].
255. See id.
256. See AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N, supra note 250.
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Aspiring firms cannot have more than 100 (upper limit, 200) retail clients, though
an unlimited number of nonretail clients are permitted. 257 They must also comply
with stipulated disclosure and other stated obligations and maintain adequate
ability to compensate investors for losses. 2 8 Still, the license waiver is promoted
as a way to test fintech products and thus to eventually ease the future path to reg-
ulation for fintech companies.
25 9
In Canada, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) supports fintech innova-
tion through its LaunchPad. The LaunchPad aspires to offer a way for fintech
firms to engage with the regulator to navigate an uncertain regulatory environ-
ment in bringing new products to the market.260 The OSC's program appears to
focus more on helping fintech firms enter a regulated space, rather than waiving
or relaxing regulations to create a space within which innovators may try out
ideas. Still, the OSC, too, has offered some regulatory accommodation to enable
services and products to be tested. For example, the OSC has granted time-lim-
ited relief from regulatory requirements for a variety of firms, subject to them
complying with certain conditions.261
Another interesting model is seen in the case of Hong Kong, whose sandbox is
open to banking firms that are already authorized by the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority. 26 2 Firms that are not authorized-like nontraditional tech startups-
257. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N, REGULATORY GUIDE 257: TESTING FINTECH PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENCE 32 (2017), https://download.asic.gov.au/
media/4420907/rg257-published-23 -august-2017.pdf; see Michael Vrisakis et al., World-First Licensing
Exemption for Fintech Businesses-ASIC's New Regulatory Sandbox, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Dec.
20, 2017), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/atest-thinking/world-first-licensing-exemption-for-
fintech-businesses-%E2%80%93-asic%E2%80%99s-new-regulatory [https://perma.cc/GLF7 -F9WH].
258. See AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N, supra note 257, at 27.
259. See AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N, supra note 250; Vrisakis et al., supra note 257.
260. See LaunchPad, ONT. SEC. COMM'N, https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/osclaunchpad.htm [https://
perma.cc/6M6N-M5SW] (last visited Dec. 10, 2018). For example, a Canadian P2P lender, the Lending
Loop, was considered to be offering "securities" under the applicable securities regulation regime
because it was offering its services to a wide range of consumers and businesses. By selling securities,
Lending Loop would have needed to undergo a costly authorization process. The OSC offered Lending
Loop authorization through direct engagement with the company, eventually making it a fully
authorized P2P lending platform. See Allan Goodman, Three Major Developments in the Regulation of
Canadian FinTech Companies, GOODMANS (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.goodmans.ca/Doc/
ThreeMajorDevelopments in the Regulation of CanadianFinTechCompanies [https://perma.cc/
FMH2-GQTN].
261. See Navigating Securities Regulation, ONT. SEC. COMM'N, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/
navigating-regulation.htm [https://perma.cc/HE89 -TWAU] (last visited Dec. 10, 2018).
262. See Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Exec., H.K. Monetary Auth. on Fintech Supervisory
Sandbox (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-
circular/2016/20160906el.pdf. Similarly, Singapore promises firms in its sandbox the prospect of
relaxed regulatory requirements for innovations to be tested in a real-world setting. Id.
Hong Kong is also proposing a new sandbox for cryptocurrency exchanges. See Hong Kong
Securities Regulator to Propose 'Sandbox' for Crypto Exchanges, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2018, 10:22 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-regulator-crypto/hong-kong-securities -regulator-to-propose-
sandbox-for-crypto-exchanges-idUSKCN1N63DU [https://perma.cc/C4FR-5QWB].
For completeness, it is worth noting that international sandbox initiatives are also being supported by
state funding into fintech. Singapore has promised to spend S$225 million over five years to develop
innovation centers for finance and support technology projects. See Jamie Lee, Singapore, London in
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must partner with an authorized banking firm to enter the sandbox.2 6 3 Once in,
innovators have considerable regulatory room to develop their ideas. The sand-
box is designed to help banking firms test new products even if those products do
not yet meet with applicable regulatory standards. In all, Hong Kong appears to
be relying on the advantages of incumbency to ensure that those participating in
the sandbox are experienced, knowledgeable, and likely to operate safely relative
to new and less familiar actors.264
In the United States, regulators have not expressly pursued the idea of an ex-
perimental sandbox but have signaled tentative support for the possibility of cre-
ating one in the future.265 U.S. regulators appear more focused on creating
institutional support structures to guide fintech firms through the regulatory pro-
cess, rather than providing specific spaces for experimentation. The CFTC, for
example, has launched LabCFTC-a dedicated unit within the agency to support
fintech development, liaise with innovators, and offer guidance on compliance.266
The SEC, in addition to issuing discrete guidance as part of its fintech regulation,
has set up a working group on the application of blockchain to U.S. markets.2 67
Although most sandboxes and regulatory innovation hubs are only in their
early years of operation, a mere cursory overview suggests that they, like other
more limited forms of regulatory innovation, are designed to grapple with
the trade-offs inherent in the trilemma. They aim to encourage financial innova-
tion and, not infrequently, to enhance the competitiveness of local markets and fi-
nancial systems. By creating a space for experimentation and dialogue with
regulators--often with the help of simplified rules and compliance frameworks-
new products can be developed and tested.
Race to Be Top Global Fintech Hub, BANKING & FIN. (Sept. 30, 2016, 5:50 AM), https://www.
businesstimes.com.sg/banking-finance/singapore-london-in-race-to-be-top-global fintech-hub [https://
perma.cc/B5VT-EFXC]; see also FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, MONETARY AUTH. OF SING. (Jan. 9,
2017), http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/FinTech-Regulatory-
Sandbox.aspx [https://perma.cc/26TL-NDG4]; Herbert Smith Freehills, Overview of Regulatory Sandbox
Regimes in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and the UK, OXFORD Bus. L. BLOG (Dec. 18,
2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/12/overview-regulatory- sandbox-regimes-
australia-hong-kong-malaysia [https://perma.cc/63AL- 39KV].
263. See Fintech Supervisory Sandbox (FSS), H.K. MONETARY AUTH. (Oct. 2, 2018) https://www.
hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech- supervisory- sandbox.shtml [https://
perma.cc/9ZVR-7C5A].
264. See Letter from Arthur Yuen, supra note 262.
265. See Neil Haggerty, Treasury's Fintech Report to Encourage Sandboxes, Weigh in on Charters,
AM. BANKER (June 21, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/treasurys-fintech-
report-to-encourage- sandboxes -weigh-in-on-charters [https://perma.cc/LC6J-SE59]; see also SEC.
INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. Ass 'N, FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX PROPOSAL (2018), https://www.sifma.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Fintech- Sandbox-Submission-May- 14-2018.pdf (showcasing support from
the industry in support of sandboxes).
It should be noted that the state of Arizona is offering a sandbox for fintech and is the first state in the
United States to do so. See Press Release, Ariz. Att'y Gen., Arizona Becomes First State in U.S. to Offer
Fintech Regulatory Sandbox (Mar. 2018), https://www.azag.gov/press-release/arizona-becomes-first-
state-us -offer-fintech-regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/TFT7 -CFVJ].
266. See LabCTFC Overview, supra note 35.
267. See SEC Fintech Forum, supra note 35 (providing page dedicated to the SEC's fintech
initiatives).
[Vol. 107:235
FINThCH AND THE INNOVATION TRILEMMA
These initiatives can offer meaningful gains. Sandboxes can help provide
notice to regulators that their rules may no longer serve the objectives that regula-
tors themselves envision. Similarly, these spaces may help refine and add nuance
to new regulation or standards that are under development because experimental
technologies reveal whether standards fall short or need supplementing in
response to previously unseen circumstances. In Canada, for example, applicable
securities regulation appeared to place constraints on the development of P2P
lending platforms, particularly those targeting retail investors. Lending Loop, a
P2P platform, faced suspension owing to its failure to comply with registration
requirements by offering "securities" under Canadian securities rules. However,
dialogue between regulators and Lending Loop (as well as other P2P platforms)
led the OSC to offer the platform the chance to become an "exempt market
dealer" to function.268
Sandboxes, then, can broaden the benefits of testing and refining compliance to
reach beyond the fintech sector. By testing the limits of regulation at its margins,
they may offer larger benefits as outdated rules are updated for the wider market
after real world experience.
Sandboxes and innovation hubs can promote rules simplicity and financial
innovation. They can offer a relaxed compliance regime for innovators. They can
also rationalize existing regulation when experimentation shows certain rules to
be unnecessary. Nevertheless, their operation can leave markets open to harmful
risks, as the trilemma would suggest. The nature of trade-offs will reflect, in part,
the regulatory parameters of the sandbox. Who can enter the sandbox? What
kinds of rules are they subject to in the period of real-world experimentation?
Perhaps most importantly, what constitutes a successful innovation? How regula-
tors answer these questions is critical to determining which innovations are per-
mitted into the market and how safely they operate once they have been approved
and licensed for use. The conditions defining experimentation thus serve to pro-
vide a gatekeeping function in keeping bad innovations out and bringing benefi-
cial innovations into use. If entry and assessment conditions are too permissive,
their gatekeeping function will end up being ineffective.
As with any regulatory framework, financial authorities can make mistakes or
errors in judgment in how they think about approving an innovation. Put simply,
the sandbox may not be sufficiently informative about how an approved innova-
tion is likely to work in the main market. Many national sandboxes-for exam-
ple, Australia, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom-require real-world
experimentation to be conducted in accordance with specified, stylized condi-
tions. For example, the ASIC's license waiver requires that innovators have no
268. See supra note 260 and accompanying text; see also Alastair Sharp, Lending Loop Reopens
Peer-to-Peer Lending After Regulator OK, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:06 PM), https://ca.reuters.com/
article/businessNews/idCAKCN1201ZR [https://perma.cc/WWQ8 -Z9SE].
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more than 200 (upper limit) retail clients or have an overall dollar exposure to
customers higher than five million (Australian dollars). 269 These conditions are,
in many ways, eminently sensible: they are designed to prevent untested products
from harming the larger market. However, they can also limit understanding of
how effectively a fintech product might work. For example, a fintech advisory
service (like robo advising) developed from a sandbox might be approved after
experimentation on 200 clients. However, it is worth asking whether this service
will be workable for a much larger and more varied cohort. Will the models
deliver the same quality of advice to a larger and more diverse group of clients in
the market? Will the models be sensitive to the aggregate impact of their advice?
What if a large population group is advised to invest in similarly risky funds?
Will the algorithms be capable of identifying and crunching data for a more com-
plex set of scenarios when the firm intends to target different types of clients?
27
At the same time, there may be a risk that regulators become overly enthusias-
tic about authorizing underdeveloped innovations and do so without sufficient
heed to market integrity. Our discussion of global regulatory initiatives reveals
the intense competition underway between countries to capture innovations and
be first to bring them to market. The first movers are likely to be rewarded with
an inflow of business as capital flows to jurisdictions that move it using state-of-
the-art technology at the lowest transaction cost. Competition between regulators
can be laudable in fostering dynamic markets. However, it might also provoke a
chaotic race to the bottom as regulators jostle for space in promoting new innova-
tions and championing national markets to the detriment of high standards in
maintaining market integrity.
This fierce competition between national regulators has not gone unnoticed.
For example, the Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(ASIFMA), an industry lobby group representing banks and investment fund
managers, has pointed to the intense competition between national regulators as a
stumbling block to progress, leading to fragmentation in the regulatory environ-
ment. 271 A key regulatory concern lies in the potential that this race to the bottom
will cause poorly performing innovations in one jurisdiction to spread risks to
another. The damaging impact of international competition on regulatory per-
formance is all too vivid. U.S. efforts to deregulate the derivatives markets under
the CFMA-designed to flaunt U.S. markets-contributed to the 2008 crisis,
269. See AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N, supra note 257, at 32; see also AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N,
supra note 250.
270. See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 13, at 731-45.
271. See Michelle Price, Hong Kong, Singapore Rivalry Hobbling Asia in $100 Billion Fintech Race:
Lobby Group, REUTERS (June 9, 2017, 3:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-fintech-
idUSKBN1900LN [https://perma.cc/K9CL-CDDV]; see also Jo Ann Barefoot, RegLabs: Time for a
Major Regulatory Experiment?, BANKmNG EXCH. (July 13, 2017, 2:48 PM), http://www.
bankingexchange.com/blogs- 3/unconventional-wisdom/item/6940-reglabs-time-for-a-major-regulatory-
experiment [https://perma.cc/Q479-Z79J] (advocating for the development of interagency "reglabs" or
regulatory laboratories to enhance interagency cooperation and reduce the negotiation costs associated
with working within a fragmented and complex regulatory structure).
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with well-known catastrophic global consequences.272 In short, as regulators de-
velop a variety of strategies to oversee fintech, the trade-offs underlying the tri-
lemma are made sharper and more complex by this innovation. This dynamic
necessitates careful reflection on the part of policymakers to craft approaches that
can facilitate innovation while also safeguarding market integrity and clarity in
rulemaking.
IV. NAVIGATING THE REGULATORY FRONTIER
Our theory of the trilemma holds that regulators, when balancing three compet-
ing policy objectives-fostering innovation, maintaining market integrity, and
offering rules simplicity-can, at best, fully achieve two out of three of these reg-
ulatory goals. We have further shown that current regulatory strategies should be
interpreted as means of avoiding the most extreme trade-offs generated by the tri-
lemma, offering a spectrum of responses that moderate opportunities and risks
among the three policy goals.
In this Part, we suggest that regulators can deal with the unique risks and
opportunities of fintech by adopting supplemental strategies designed to foster:
(i) domestic agency cooperation; (ii) international standard setting; (iii) and better
private self-governance of emerging technologies. By pairing these strategies
with regulatory experimentation, the trilemma's risks of market instability and
rules complexity can be hedged and more effectively mitigated. Although the tri-
lemma cannot be avoided, its most damaging gaps can be more systematically
assessed and controlled through the adoption of these supplementary strategies.
Our proposal does not seek to stifle innovation or introduce unnecessary com-
plexity to rulemaking. Rather, it aims to promote greater information generation
and sharing both between regulators and between the private and public sectors
as a way to capture a nuanced and complete picture of the risks created by innova-
tion. Deeply informed regulators, we envision, should make more thoughtful and
reasoned policy choices, reducing the risks posed by new financial creations
while also finding ways to nurture the benefits these innovations can offer.
A. DOMESTIC AGENCY COOPERATION
Financial innovation-and fintech in particular-often arises in the interstices
of any country's regulatory ecosystem; that is, discrete parts of transaction value
chains are disintermediated by actors that pay little heed to traditional functional
and regulatory boundaries.
This straddling necessitates strong domestic regulatory coordination to achieve
any of the three regulatory goals. Such coordination would involve domestic reg-
ulators pooling information, sharing expertise, and identifying areas of common
concern when innovations straddle sectoral boundaries. By doing so, regulators
can acquire a fuller picture about the ways in which innovations (such as block-
chain, virtual currencies, and alternative data) might impact financial markets
272. See supra notes 90-92.
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broadly, not just within the purview of their specific agency. Regulators can better
calibrate the potential impact of fintech on market integrity and devise rules in a
coordinated manner that can facilitate greater clarity and simplicity in
rulemaking.
From the standpoint of market integrity, coordination is necessary to prevent
risks that can grow in the gaps of sectoral oversight. As we have seen, the deci-
sion to deregulate one sector-say, through special fintech bank charters-can
impact the larger banking sector and payments system.273 Meanwhile, the inter-
disciplinary nature of many activities requires responses by multiple regulatory
agencies to be effectuated properly. For example, for fintech firms that assist in
settling securities trades or for those in digital currencies, permission would be
necessary and desirable not only from the OCC, but also from the Federal
Reserve, CFTC, and SEC.274 In the absence of a coordinated response, regulators
risk adopting diverse approaches that stifle financial innovation, add complexity
to rules, and make enforcement of the rules a source of systemic risk.
In short, coordination gives regulators a stronger handle on the full spectrum of
new products being introduced into domestic markets and the risks these innova-
tions generate. 27' For regulators such as the SEC, CFTC, and Federal Reserve,
each policing their respective jurisdictional turfs, coordination offers sharper
insight into the full uses of a specific technology, as well as the problems it might
generate across different sectors and agency jurisdictions. Innovations such as
blockchain, specifically designed to create a distributed network for recording
transactions (and perhaps settling transactions) can easily be applied to both
securities exchanges (SEC), and transactions in derivatives (generally, the
CFTC). In turn, failures in this technology, which underpin large-scale securities
trading mechanisms, will impact financial stability (Federal Reserve and OCC).
Similarly, payments technology, or peer-to-peer lending, designed to facilitate
money flows between retail as well as corporate users, can also implicate con-
sumer protection risks, engaging the jurisdiction of federal authorities such as the
CFPB and state regulators.
Coordination can help regulators pool their insights and improve their individ-
ual analysis of an innovation to draw the lines (and stipulate acceptable trade-
offs) that best represent their respective policy goals. By gaining insight into the
273. See John ReVeal & Rebecca H. Laird, The OCC's New Fintech Bank Charter-What You Need
to Know, K&L GATES (Aug. 24, 2018), http://www.klgates.com/the-occs-new-fintech-bank-charter-
what -you-need-to-know-08 -24-2018/ [https://perma.cc/84M2-5FLU].
274. See Gunjan Banerji, Bitcoin Options Exchange Wins Approval From CFTC, WALL ST. J. (July
24, 2017, 6:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-options-exchange-wins-approval-from-cftc-
1500935886 [https://perma.cc/L6Q9-XWY5] (noting differing agency postures and perspectives in
regulating certain crypto-related products and technologies).
275. We do not examine the constitutional and administrative law issues that may be implicated by
the greater coordination between domestic agencies. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B.
Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010) (discussing
constitutional and administrative implications from the independence-accountability hybrid agency
approach).
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collective risks they face, regulators can decide how to approach rulemaking with
respect to a new innovation. Can new innovations be regulated effectively under
existing rules and standards? Or do old rules require adaptations to suit emerging
technology? As evidenced by minimally interventionist no-action letters, regula-
tors may determine that minor modifications to existing regulation may suffice to
absorb the risks to new regulation.276 On the other hand, as exemplified by the
OCC's fintech charter and the SEC's retail equity crowdfunding regime, a novel
deployment of regulatory tools may be viewed as necessary to tackle new risks
and opportunities arising in financial markets.2 77
In all cases, coordination allows for a more tailored treatment that is specifi-
cally calibrated to address the risk that an innovation carries across financial mar-
kets, rather than in just one sector. This observation is not to suggest that all
regulators should apply the same rules or exercise oversight with uniform inten-
sity. Inevitably, different agencies will vary in their intensity and focus, depend-
ing on the degree of risk posed by a particular innovation. The SEC might be
expected to pay special attention to robo advisors and their Al, given their signifi-
cance for securities markets and the scope of the SEC's authority over investment
advisors. However, in all cases, coordination between agencies permits the
Federal Reserve, CFTC, and SEC to pool insights, knowledge, and regulatory ex-
perience to understand how robo advisors affect the financial markets broadly. It
may be, for example, that the increasing market share of robo advisors means that
their failure raises concerns about prudential, systemic stability-an issue of in-
terest for the Federal Reserve.
Finally, interagency coordination can benefit fintech firms. In seeking to miti-
gate the effects of the trilemma, a more efficiently administered compliance re-
gime may give regulators room to pass a tougher set of rules for market safety
while maintaining a workable on-ramp to innovation. As we have described, fin-
tech is characterized by nonincumbent firms that are increasingly taking the lead
in innovation. These newer firms may be new to compliance in financial regula-
tion, placing them at a disadvantage competitively to more seasoned actors.
Moreover, they may not possess the resources, including money to pay for legal
fees or registration costs, to even attempt entry into financial markets. 278 To the
extent that regulators might wish to encourage innovation, the trilemma explains
that they would need to relax and simplify the rules to do so, at a risk to market
integrity.
Coordination can help reduce the compliance costs facing newer entrants, open-
ing the door for regulators to potentially impose stricter regulation. Where regula-
tors see an innovation that might be implemented across markets-including
equity, derivatives, and banking-they may consider whether joint permission and
oversight is appropriate. This approach ease the costs on new firms that wish to
276. See supra Section III.A.
277. See supra Section III.C.
278. See id.
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offer their services to multiple markets, allowing the firms to traverse a host of reg-
ulatory and jurisdictional regimes. It may also allow regulators to jointly craft con-
ditions that holistically reflect a firm's risks, streamlining compliance costs. As
shown by the OCC's proposal for its fintech charter, regulators appear willing to
move on a case-by-case basis and prepared to adopt bespoke conditions based on
the firm seeking to gain authorization.279 The OCC's approach may be broadened
so that a firm can apply to multiple regulators at once for a joint determination.
Under such a regime, fintech firms may be incentivized to enter markets. The
stipulated conditions under which fintech firms pursue their activities may also be
better tailored to their risk profile.
Such a streamlined approach is far from perfect, particularly in light of how
U.S. market regulation is currently structured. It would require agencies to over-
come decades of fierce jurisdictional battles, and regulators may not achieve con-
sensus on risks to successfully create a joint mandate for fintech firms. As noted
above, the OCC and the Federal Reserve, for example, may emphasize risks to fi-
nancial stability, whereas the SEC may highlight risks impacting market effi-
ciency and investor protection, and the CFPB may focus on how a firm's
activities affect consumer interests. Additionally, how might existing, incumbent
firms react if fintech actors appear to enjoy a potentially simplified, more stream-
lined regulatory regime?
These problems may not be insurmountable. Notably, following the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, agencies have sought to institutionalize formal mechanisms for
coordination on matters of financial regulation and systemic risk through the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).2 80 Moreover, incumbent financial
firms may be willing to accept a consolidated regime with potentially lower com-
pliance costs for fintech firms when permission clearly and narrowly stipulates
the conditions under which these firms can operate. Fully authorized incumbents
may tolerate a distinct regulatory regime for fintech firms where incumbents can
continue to operate to the maximum extent permissible under existing regimes.
As with a failure by regulators to coordinate with their peers internationally, a
failure by agencies to work in lockstep may catalyze a race to the bottom through
which agencies compete to capture the next big innovation. Competition between
regulators and a lack of coordination and information sharing may incentivize fin-
tech firms to look for the lowest cost compliance regime to enter the market. Put
simply, a firm may look for those regulators that offer entry on lax terms, with
279. See id.
280. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 29. For insightful discussion of the goals
and mechanisms underlying FSOC's authority to designate firms as systemically risky and needing more
intensive consolidated supervision, see Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 31. For perspectives on the costs
of the FSOC's designation power and the significance of nuanced, consolidated supervision to develop
informational resources for regulators, see Hilary J. Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability" in
Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. LJ. 1087, 1091-1110 (2015) (discussing the
structure and function of the FSOC and the significance of expertise and political neutrality); Christina
Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379 (2017).
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greatest rules simplicity, thereby increasing peril to market integrity more
broadly.
B. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING AND COORDINATION
Similarly, international coordination is a necessary and natural complement to
regulatory experimentation and adaption. 281 Fintech services are digitally based,
easily scalable, and operationalized across borders. To minimize risks to market
integrity-especially consumer and systemic risks that can be exported abroad-
regulators will have to work closely with one another.282 Where they do not,
excessively heterogeneous processes and approaches could not only stifle the
growth and development of socially beneficial innovation, but also enable the
obfuscation of risk and the undermining of vital information sharing and data
assessment.
Differing national approaches have the benefit of adding layers of extra com-
fort and security for regulators charged with protecting their domestic markets.
However, multiple compliance regimes do not always add to consumer protection
or financial stability, and in some instances can detract from it, all while adding
to regulatory compliance costs. For example, in the case of regulatory reporting
for the OTC derivatives implicated in the 2008 crisis, both the United States and
the European Union have come up with diverging data fields and reporting stand-
ards for swaps repositories as part of regulatory reforms to track the build-up of
risk in derivatives markets. 283 But because the standards are, in fact, not entirely
standardized, not only is reporting more complicated, but information gathered is
not always (or even normally) easily able to be aggregated and analyzed by super-
visors.284 Thus, not only is it harder for firms to develop new and better techno-
logical methods and approaches to report data, but market integrity is ultimately
undermined.285
It is worth adding that insufficient international coordination-combined with
fierce competition between regulators to attract innovative businesses-can also
trigger a regulatory race to the bottom. Even without this situation, the idiosyn-
cratic risk preferences of one set of national regulators may be unacceptable to
281. See Lev Bromberg et al., Cross-Border Cooperation in Financial Regulation: Crossing the
Fintech Bridge, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 59 (2018) (noting the potential for cross-border cooperation on
fintech based on such past cooperation through the International Organization for Securities
Commissions).
282. See CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: How TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (2014) (discussing the move towards local
regional alliance building in smaller regional communities); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012) [hereinafter BRUMMER, SOFT
LAW] (examining the system of soft-law rulemaking and standard- setting in post-crisis global
regulation).
283. See CHRISTOPHER MURPHY ET AL., ATL. COUNCIL, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE:
TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL REFORM & THE G20 AGENDA 29-39 (2013), http://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/images/publications/DangerofDivergenceTransatlanticFinancialReform_ 1-22.pdf.
284. See id. at 40-49.
285. See id.
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others, such that innovations in one jurisdiction may not be acceptable more
widely. Divergence in the intensity of oversight between regulators can be seen
in how regulators encourage new entrants to their markets and the kinds of crite-
ria they set for those wishing to test out new technologies. Sandboxes, for exam-
ple, vary substantively in the eligibility criteria they set for entry and
participation. Whereas Hong Kong limits its sandboxes to regulated banks or
those that work with banks, others, such as those of the United Kingdom and
Australia, are open to nontraditional, smaller firms, including startups.
286
Jurisdictions also differ in how much risk they permit those in their sandboxes to
take, with variations in how much money and the number of customers that may
be placed at risk. Some sandboxes, as in Hong Kong, do not specify a fixed time
limit for testing but others, such as those of Australia, do.287
Cross-border coordination could, if effective, provide an antidote, at least in
part, to these challenges. However, achieving such coordination will not be easy.
Regulators have divergent mandates and objectives and oversee vastly different
economies. Some regulators may prioritize financial inclusiveness and innovation
in capital access, whereas regulators of more mature markets may emphasize
innovations that shore up the progress already achieved. Jurisdictions invariably
vary in the intensity of oversight they exercise in authorizing new innovations
and the conditions under which new innovations are accepted into the main body
of the financial system. Regulators are also likely to offer different levels of liti-
gation and enforcement immunity, leading to varying answers to basic regulatory
questions, including: what kinds of errors will firms be allowed to make in the
trial process and what quality of fail-safes must firms use to remedy deficiencies
and participate fully in markets? Or, with innovation being led by smaller firms
with diminishing reliance on traditional intermediaries, what protections will reg-
ulators impose on entrants that may not be sufficiently mature or profitable
enough to hold large capital buffers or internalize large compliance costs?
Regulators can also diverge in what policy goals they expect fintech to achieve
for financial markets. For instance, Malaysia and Singapore envision that innova-
tions nurtured in their national sandboxes will, first and foremost, benefit
Malaysian and Singaporean domestic markets. 288 The criteria by which innova-
tions are analyzed, accepted for use, and implemented appear to be primarily
determined by reference to the characteristics of the regulator's domestic mar-
kets. Given these idiosyncratic preferences, one regulator's particular assessment
metrics may not fully align with its peers in another jurisdiction. Yet innovations
fostered in one may impact markets in others, including through the payments or
banking systems. One country's regulators may also give permission for products
authorized in another country to be used in its home market. This occurrence may
286. See supra Section III.D.
287. See HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, HONG KONG LAUNCHES REGULATORY SANDBOX IN WAKE OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AND THE UK (2016), http://sites.
herbertsmithfreehills.vuturevx.com/103/12430/landing-pages/2016.09.30-apac -fintech-briefing.pdf.
288. See id.
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happen if both countries believe that the other's regulatory supervisory systems
are robust and reliable. However, such assumptions may prove illusory, resulting
in risks moving from one country to another.
Still, international coordination and standard-setting offers a mechanism by
which regulators can narrow differences and reach base-line consensus on how to
understand and assess new innovations and articulate the terms of this agreement.
Greater recognition of shared risk can help motivate regulators to overcome both
policy and political differences, and the desire to compete for capital may provide
regulators with incentives to institute the lowest cost compliance regime within
their home markets.
Forums within which policymakers can discuss emerging technologies can
help cure some of the gaps in the trilemma as well as the tendency to legislate at
its poles, helping regulators to more fully understand new technology and fill in-
formation gaps. The value of such dialogue is especially high in fintech given that
it presents new and unfamiliar risks-for example, reliance on sophisticated algo-
rithms, nonincumbent firms, and big data. With regulators able to jointly convene
to discuss fintech, they can better analyze how complex algorithms are likely to
work, develop a richer history on the risks and operations of new firms, and
understand the limits of the data available to them. This process can help regula-
tors formulate joint standards about activities that can create a more informed and
more level, playing field for fintech activity.
Finally, international coordination and standard-setting is familiar territory for
financial market regulators following the 2008 financial crisis. The post-crisis
regulatory architecture, organized under the aegis of the G-20 group of nations,
has successfully promulgated a series of soft, nonbinding directives to codify a
basic set of shared standards across areas.289 From banking and derivatives to
securitization, a swath of the post-crisis financial regulatory architecture has been
put in place through international consensus-building and standard-setting. 290
It follows that this existing framework for market regulation may be harnessed
to develop a more coordinated regulatory response to fintech. For example, the
International Organization for Securities Commissions, the standard-setting fo-
rum for securities market regulators, has signaled concerns about emerging fin-
tech and the risks of diverging national regulatory regimes. 291 Similarly, the
Financial Stability Board convenes regulatory fintech working groups, though as
of this writing, they have, for the most part, focused on financial stability and
289. See generally BRUMMER, SOFT LAW, supra note 282, at 62-114. As Brummer writes, owing to a
variety of levers, these soft standards are hard in practice, creating pressure on regulators to ensure their
adoption into national law. Id. at 111- 12.
290. For discussion on the history of soft law in international financial regulation and the institutional
mechanisms underpinning its development, see id.
291. See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
(FINTECH) 31-35 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf.
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banking (and central banking).292 The need for coordination between work
streams remains essential, as fintech innovations like blockchain or artificial intel-
ligence straddle functional regulatory classifications and impact financial as well
as securities markets. It seems timely to more systematically address fintech
across international standard-setting bodies and member countries.293
C. PRIVATE MONITORING AND INDUSTRY CODES OF CONDUCT
Finally, regulatory innovation and experimentation should be bolstered by
complementary support structures in the private sector. New fintech firms and
incumbents alike can help reduce risks to markets by: (i) monitoring each other;
(ii) setting rules of the road for their industries to privately codify acceptable
standards; and (iii) privately enforcing these norms through industry sanction,
reputational harm, and exclusion from the market in case of egregious behavior.
Encouraging private self-regulation as a supplement to robust public oversight
can mitigate difficulties endemic to the trilemma. Private self-regulation can be
especially helpful in filling gaps and informing the quality of public regulatory
oversight. It brings together industry players to regulate and police one another.
Beyond offering an added layer of oversight, private self-regulation can help
make market participants more directly responsible for maintaining high stand-
ards within their industry. Common forms of such oversight allow firms to design
a framework of rules and norms to govern their behavior and to control the risks
that such conduct might create. 294 To ensure compliance with these standards,
self-regulation can include disciplinary and adjudicatory mechanisms to sanction
those that do not play by the rules. Finally, self-regulatory industry organizations
can pool informational and analytical resources as part of their regulatory and
enforcement processes.
This kind of oversight has many advantages, especially for fintech. First, pri-
vate firms can provide regulators with a source of knowledge on emerging tech-
nologies. Regulators can arguably benefit from interaction with those that are
most familiar with technology such as machine learning algorithms, distributed
ledger operating systems, or alternative data.295 Further, as fintech focuses on dis-
intermediating traditional financial functions, regulators can benefit from gaining
intelligence on the technology that promises to replace the long-established
292. See, e.g., U.S. FIN. STABIITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH:
SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES' ATTENTION (2017), http://www.fsb.
org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf.
293. See Bromberg et al., supra note 281.
294. See Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of
the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT'L. L. 9,
19-29 (2013); Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives
Regulation? 2 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 39,
2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=293085 [https://perma.cc/X8UY-MH9X].
295. For example, some banks have called for greater private self-regulation in development of
common standard for blockchain technologies. See Ian Allison, Barclays, Goldman Champion ISDA
Standard for Blockchain Derivatives, COINDESK (Apr. 27, 2018, 8:01 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/
barclays-goldman-champion-isda-standard-blockchain-derivatives/ [https://perma.cc/HT9D-UY9K].
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market structure. By formalizing channels for regulators to communicate with
practitioners, regulators can lessen the challenges of interpreting data and can bet-
ter understand risks and how they might fit within existing law. Regulators may
benefit by facilitating interactions through formal industry organizations, rather
than one or two big firms. By communicating with an industry body, such as a
trade association, regulators might not only gain a diverse breadth of knowledge,
but also avoid becoming captured by large firms.
In fintech, such collaborative initiatives are already underway and appear to
have been productive. Most notably, Canadian authorities worked with R3, an
industry blockchain consortium comprising eighty financial firms, as part of its
study into whether to put their interbank payment system on a blockchain settle-
ment system. After discussion with the consortium, Canada decided not to adopt
this technology, determining that the technology was not ready for its domestic
use.
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There are also good reasons for firms to develop strong industry rules and
norms. By crafting robust oversight and disciplinary mechanisms, firms can trans-
act with others on a surer footing, better assured as to a basic standard of quality
with respect to financial products and services and the participants that offer
them. In financial markets, where risks can spread quickly through interconnected
networks and supply chains, such comfort can bring important benefits. Firms do
not have to repeatedly internalize high investigation and due diligence costs with
respect to each counterparty. They can also share information, increasing collec-
tive reserves of insight to understand these risks and to prevent them from arising.
Perhaps most importantly, self-regulation can permit industry players to have a
degree of control in crafting standards and in enforcing them. To the extent that
private firms possess expertise and frontline knowledge about the industry, such
control may be exercised in an informed and precise manner. If self-regulation
results in a reliable body of standards and norms, firms may be able to avoid being
subject to heavy top-down regulation.
Importantly, regulation may benefit from industry self-monitoring and
informal enforcement through reputational sanction or exclusion. This benefit
may be especially helpful in contexts in which policymakers decide to pursue
innovation and rules simplicity, at a likely cost to market integrity. When regula-
tion is expressly favorable to industry in a bid to foster innovation, private
self-regulation may promote adherence to core standards that those within the
industry consider appropriate to the risks. This result can create a second source
of oversight, particularly if public regulation is less intensive. For example, pri-
vate securities exchanges have long regulated their traders as well as issuers for
compliance with laws and industry norms. In addition to making rules, exchanges
296. See Neil Ainger, Canada Backs Off Blockchain Interbank Payment System, CNBC (May 26,
2017, 6:19 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/26/canada-backs-off-blockchain-interbank-payment-
system.html [https://perma.cc/G6M3-TQSX]; Anna Irrera, JPMorgan Chase & Co Leaves Blockehain
Consortium R3, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2017, 2:29 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-r-
idUSKBN17T2T4 [https://perma.cc/TP82-7L67].
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are also tasked with enforcing securities laws against those that use their
services.
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Of course, private self-regulation can also fall short. For example, exchanges
have been critiqued for sometimes taking an overly lax approach to supervision
and enforcement. 298 And critically, in the years prior to the 2008 crisis, industry
self-regulation in the over-the-counter swaps market (like CDS) fell well below
what was needed to keep markets safe, and likely contributed to the intensity of
the failure.299
We do not suggest that private self-regulation replace robust public oversight
of fintech-to the contrary. We only note that industry can offer a helpful super-
visory and supplemental backstop, facilitating a more informed understanding of
emerging technology as well as a mechanism for private peer monitoring between
specialist actors. Perhaps most importantly, giving private industry actors a role
in the regulatory framework can yield benefits -for example, through consulta-
tions with policymakers or in the exercise of private peer discipline. Such a role
can force industry players to more deeply examine the technologies they are
bringing to the market, the risks these create, and how private actors may safe-
guard their own firms against a crisis. Rather than simply focus on the profits and
opportunities offered by fintech, the process of developing industry standards and
codes of conduct may provide a way for fintech to mature. As industry gains a
fuller picture of the net costs of activities, those that enter the markets may be bet-
ter equipped to understand and absorb these costs.
CONCLUSION
Innovation is a constant feature of financial markets, but not all financial inno-
vation is the same. In this latest iteration of market creativity, policymakers are
confronting a digital disintermediation of traditional financial services providers
that leverages more and qualitatively different forms of data as well as automa-
tion and machine learning. Collectively, these developments exacerbate long-
standing trade-offs regulators face when tasked with exercising oversight over
changing markets. Using the analytical lens of a trilemma, we take a first step to
more clearly articulate these trade-offs and their implications for regulation.
Specifically, we argue that when seeking to provide clear rules, maintain market
integrity, and encourage financial innovation, regulators have long been able to
achieve, at best, only two out of these three goals. Moreover, the new technolo-
gies transforming markets complicate discerning where along the policy frontier
any decision is situated given their own novel (and untested) nature.
297. See Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failure in Securities Markets, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2754786 [https://perma.cc/K5VL-49BT].
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We have observed that regulators are modifying well-worn approaches to over-
sight as well as innovating new ones to adapt to digital markets. Yet even these
creative administrative responses are beset by their own limitations including
insufficient international and even domestic coordination. With this in mind, this
Article has set out pathways to more fully equip policymakers with tools to adapt
their markets to fintech and its risks and opportunities.

